Duquesne Law Review
Volume 13

Number 3

Article 2

1975

The Antitrust Exemption for Labor - Magna Carta or Carte
Blanche?
Allen G. Siegel
Walter B. Connolly Jr.
Richard K. Walker

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allen G. Siegel, Walter B. Connolly Jr. & Richard K. Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor - Magna
Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13 Duq. L. Rev. 411 (1975).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol13/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Duquesne Law Review
Volume 13, Number 3, Spring, 1975

The Antitrust Exemption for LaborMagna Carta or Carte Blanche?
Allen G. Siegel*
Walter B. Connolly, Jr.**
Richard K. Walker***

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................

415

A. Passage of the Sherman Act and Early Case Law .....................
B. The Second Phase: Passageof the Clayton Act and Its Impact .........
1. The Move to Create an Exemption for Labor ....................
2. Effect of the Clayton Act ......................................
C. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct and the Revolution In Judicial Attitudes ....
1. Congress Moves to Limit Judicial Equity Power .................
2. Early Effects of Norris-LaGuardia ..............................

415
420
420
427
435
435
439
445
445
447
450
453
457

RECENT CASE LAW: ELABORATION ON POST-NoRRIs-LAGuARDIA TRENDS

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

........

Los Angeles Meat Drivers' Local 626 v. United States .................
UMW v. Pennington ...............................................
Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.............................
American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll .........................
Ram sey v. UM W ..................................................

*LL.B. (with distinction) Duke University (1960); Labor Partner, Arent, Fox, Kintner,
Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.; Member, District of Columbia and Florida Bars.
**Assistant Counsel for the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio; Professor,
College of Business, Kent State University; Member, Litigation Committee, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce.

***J.D., University of Kansas (1975).

Vol. 13: 411

Duquesne Law Review
PENDING CASES: EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS

III.

A.
B.
C.
IV.

THE CASE

FOR APPLICATION

OF THE ANTITRUST

ACTIVITIES ................................................

A.
B.
C.
V.

.......................

Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Committee ..
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100 .......
Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construction Trades Council .
LAWS TO

CERTAIN UNION

............

Social and Legislative Changes Since the Passage of the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardiaActs .............................................
Accommodating Conflicting Policies .................................
Legitimate Union Activity and the Legality of Union Conduct That
R estrains Trade ...................................................

C ONCLUSION

...........................................................

458
458
462
465
466
466
470
472
478

All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which
they exist; above all rights rises duty to the community. The
conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the
community. Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act' in 1890, the
applicability of the antitrust laws to organizations of workers has
been the subject of much debate. In a time when the menace of
inflation threatens the very fiber of our society, and competition
from foreign producers is draining our national reservoir of economic
strength, the considerations that underlie this debate must come
again to the fore.
Presently, most activities of labor unions are exempted from the
sanctions of the Sherman Act by §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act'
and the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26
Stat. 209).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat.
731); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat.
738).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, §§ 1-15,
47 Stat. 70).
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But are the basic premises upon which this exemption is founded
as valid today as they were at the time the Clayton and NorrisLaGuardia Acts were passed by Congress? Do the antitrust laws
provide a suitable vehicle for regulation of the activities of labor
unions? Should the labor exemption be narrowed, or even eliminated? All these questions must be given serious consideration in
the days to come.
This article proposes to consider the nature and scope of the labor
exemption, from both a historical and contemporary perspective,
and to analyze objectively the efficacy of changes which might be
made. An attempt will also be made to evaluate proposals for
change in light of present needs and the philosophy of the antitrust
laws.
At the outset, however, it will perhaps serve a useful purpose to
outline the competing positions which should be kept clearly in
mind throughout the ensuing discussion. The basic position of the
unions is that organization is necessary to give the worker the leverage necessary to deal on equal terms with his employer. In order for
this organization or combination to be effective it must encompass
all of those within the same trade and within the same community
because each will be affected by the price of their trade in the
community. Finally, the unions see the strike as a necessary instrument in the economic struggle between labor and capital to determine how their joint product will be divided.4
It is, of course, clear that many of the means employed by unions
to achieve the above objectives necessarily restrain trade. Moreover,
advocates of a strong labor movement argue that the efficiency with
which the interests of the individual worker can be protected is a
function of the degree to which the available means can be employed on a grand scale. Therefore, so the argument runs, combination and collaboration among unions is essential to the very wellbeing of the worker. Finally, it is maintained that a strong, unified
labor movement provides a check on the tendency of big business
to dominate political and economic affairs by giving the workers a

4. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
209 (1921).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 411

major voice in the society's decision-making processes.
Against these arguments, management proponents contend that
labor unions have become too powerful, upsetting the delicate balance which is essential if the concept of collective bargaining is to
retain any meaning. To support this contention, it is pointed out
that unions can, and often do, drive employers out of business
through excessive demands, strikes or secondary pressures such as
boycotts. Management advocates further complain that, in many
instances, existing labor laws have been ineffectual in deterring
unlawful violence and secondary activities which tend to restrain
trade.
The third position which must receive consideration is that of the
public interest. While the public interest is broad enough to embrace the narrow interests of unions, employers and even individual
employees, it also includes certain interests of a higher order, before
which the narrower interests, insofar as they are incompatible, must
yield. The paramount concern from this perspective is the deceleration of the rate of inflation. Other public concerns would include the
minimization of disruptions in the availability of goods and services,
and the maintenance of public order.
Although this outline of interests is hardly exhaustive, even an
incomplete listing makes one thing very clear: the dynamic interplay of the various competing interests makes what has been referred to as "legislation by slogan and equity by analogy," 5 a dangerous game indeed. In most respects, the study of labor-management
relations cannot be regarded as the study of a dyadic relationship.
Rather, alterations of the labor-management relationship must be
fashioned with an eye toward their ramifications in an entire sociopolitical ecosystem which embraces the broad spectrum of interests
briefly discussed above.
When Congress first passed the Clayton Act, the language therein
which sought to exempt labor from the thrust of the antitrust laws
was hailed by Samuel Gompers as labor's "Magna Carta." 6 The
labor exemption has more recently been deprecated as a veritable

5. Meyers, Unions, Anti-trust Laws, and Inflation, 1 CALIF. MANAGEMENT Rsv. 36, 37
(1959).
6. Gompers, The Charterof Industrial Freedom-LaborProvisions of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 957 (1914).
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carte blanche for union irresponsibility and lawlessness It is hoped
that the discussion and conclusions following will reflect a reasoned
approach, sufficiently deferential to the far-reaching implications
necessarily attendant upon a problem of such complexity, which
can serve to inject an element of objectivity into a controversy that
has too frequently been obscured by reliance upon emotional epithet.
I.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Passage of the Sherman Act and Early Case Law

When the Sherman Antitrust Act became law on July 2, 1890, its
thrust was embodied in two somewhat delphic provisions:
SEC. 1 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such
contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 8
In addition to the criminal sanctions, the Act provided for injunctive relief,9 available upon petition from the government, and dam-

Denbo, Labor Exemption-An Anti View, 20 FED. B.J. 30 (1960).
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. 88 1, 2 (1970).
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 4, 26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) provided:
The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several
district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction
of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such

7.
8.
9.
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ages 10 to be awarded those aggrieved by the proscribed activity.
There were no explicit indications in the language of the Act that
was passed as to what, if any, exemptions to its application there
might be.
To be sure, the question of whether the activities of labor unions
would fall under the purview of the broad proscriptions which were
to become § § 1 and 2 received more than passing attention in the
debates in Congress." At one point, Senator Sherman, mindful of
the concern that his bill might be construed to inhibit the activities
of labor unions, offered a proviso which would have exempted agreements, combinations or arrangements between workers, entered
into for the purpose of affecting hours and wages."
The bill was later referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, and when it was reported out, the proviso had been deleted." It has been very cogently argued that the proviso was deleted
because it was thought unnecessary." Basically, the argument is
that the proviso was offered in response to objections which had
been aimed at language in the original bill stating that all combinations, the effect of which was to increase consumer prices, were to
be prohibited. Since this language was dropped by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and since the concerns which had been voiced by
violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and
praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties
complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed,
as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such
petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary
restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
10. Section 7 of the Sherman Act provided:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may
sue therefore in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover three fold the damage by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210, repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69
Stat. 283. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731 (1914), provides the present authority for treble damage suits.
11. For a very complete and informative discussion of the various opinions expressed on
this issue in the course of the congressional debates see E. BERAiN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN
Acr 11-51 (1930) [hereinafter cited as BERMAN].

12. 51

CONG.

Rac. 13,908 (1914). Another proviso which would have exempted labor was

offered by Senator Aldrich. BERMAN, supra note 11, at 22.
13. BsRMAN, supra note 11, at 37.

14. Id. at 35-41.
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those fearing that labor unions would be affected by the Sherman
Bill had been in response to such language, it is maintained that the
proviso was dropped under the assumption that the bill, as it was
reported out of committee and later passed, had no potential of
reaching labor unions. This assumption, if it in fact was indulged
in by those responsible for the deletion of the proviso, never reached
the record, and the intent behind the deletion
proved to be a point
5
about which reasonable men could differ.
Less than three years after the passage of the Sherman Act, the
question of whether Congress had intended labor unions to be subject to the Act was squarely presented to a federal court. In United
5 the Government
States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council,"
sought an injunction to restrain a wide-spread strike in the city of
New Orleans which had the effect of tying up traffic intended for
interstate commerce. Judge Billings, writing for the court, granted
the injunction, and had no trouble finding a violation of the antitrust law. He reasoned that, although the original impetus to enact
the legislation had come from the evils of massed capital, by the
time of its passage, the legislature had decided that the source of
the evil was irrelevant and they, therefore, outlawed all combinations in restraint of trade."
Following Amalgamated Council, there came a veritable avalanche of cases 8 arising out of the Pullman strike of 1894. Each of
these cases either expressly or impliedly followed the Amalgamated
Council rationale, with one of them, United States v. Debs,11 reaching the Supreme Court. 20The Supreme Court, however, specifically
15.
16.
17.

See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 13,908 (1914) (remarks of Senator Pomerene).
54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
Judge Billings' exact words were as follows:
I think the congressional debates show that the [antitrust] statute had its origin in
the evils of massed capital; but, when the congress came to formulating the prohibition
. . . it expressed it in these words: "Every contract or combination in the form of trust,
or otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." The subject had so broadenedin the minds
of the legislators that the source of the evil was not regardedas material,and the evil
in its entirety is dealt with.
Id. at 996 (emphasis supplied).
18. E.g., United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. ll. 1894); United States v. Elliot,
63 F. 801 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894); United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1895).
19. 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. ll. 1894).
20. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). The lower court had found Eugene V. Debs, leader
of the American Railway Union, guilty of contempt for defying a very broad injunction issued
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declined to rule on the question of the applicability of the antitrust
law to labor, and chose instead to uphold the lower court decision
on other grounds."
It was not until 1908, in the so-called Danbury Hatters" case, that
the Supreme Court ruled on the use of the Sherman Act against
labor organizations. The case involved an action for treble damages
brought by the Loewe Company, a hat manufacturer, against officers and members of the Brotherhood of United Hatters of North
America."5 The plaintiff alleged that it had suffered substantial
damages as a result of a nation-wide consumer boycott organized by
the defendant union with the cooperation of the American Federation of Labor in an attempt to coerce the plaintiff into agreeing to
the institution of a closed shop at its place of business. Reversing
the dismissal of the suit by the district court,2 ' the Supreme Court
unanimously held that labor organizations were subject to the Sherman Act, and that secondary boycotts were illegal under the Act if
they affected interstate commerce. The Court dealt almost perfunctorily with the question of legislative intent:
The act made no distinction between classes. It provided
to restrain the Pullman strike. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894). The case
was then appealed to the Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus.
21. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895).
22. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
23. Note that, unlike the situation which was to become familiar, this case did not involve
an action against a union, per se, but against its members.
24. All cases preceding the Danbury Hatters case in which the Sherman Act had been
applied to unions had involved an interference with the transportationof goods in interstate
commerce. See, e.g., cases cited note 18 supra, It was upon the absence of such interference
that the district court had focused in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint:
The argument for the plaintiffs is that by entering into a scheme to curtail the
production at home, and the distribution by customers abroad, the defendants have
formed a combination to limit and restrain plaintiffs' trade between the two points,
which is interstate trade, and that such restraint is the direct, positive, and inevitable
result of the general scheme. The manufacture of the hats before they leave the factory
in Danbury is not interstate commerce, nor are the hats themselves up to that time
the subject of interstate commerce. The distribution of the hats from the hands of the
customers in other states to the ultimate consumer is not interstate commerce, nor are
the hats themselves during such distribution the subject of interstate commerce.
The real question is whether a combination which undertakes to interfere simultaneously with both actions is one which directly affects the transportation of the hats from
the place of manufacture to the place of sale. It is not perceived that the Supreme
Court has as yet so broadened the interpretation of the Sherman Act . . . that it will
fit such an order of facts as this complaint presents.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 148 F. 924, 925 (C.C.D. Conn. 1906).
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that "every" contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade was illegal. The records of Congress show that several
efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of
farmers and laborers from the operation of the act and that all
these efforts failed, so that the act remained as we have it
before us.2"
The Court then went on to quote the language from the
Amalgamated Council case set out above.26 It has been suggested
that the Court in Danbury Hatters was guilty of relying too heavily
upon misleading statements in the brief submitted by plaintiff's
counsel regarding this point, and that had the Court embarked upon
a thorough search of the legislative record, it might have reached a
very different conclusion.27 Whatever the merits of this contention,
however, it is clear that by the time the Danbury Hatters case was
decided, the judiciary was fully committed to the conclusion that
the Sherman Act's proscriptions had been intended to embrace the
activities of labor as well as business. In a later decision involving
the Hatters, the Supreme Court further broadened the scope of
the Sherman Act's impact by holding that individual union members could be held liable for acts committed by union officials,
where the members paid dues and supported their officers in full
knowledge that unlawful acts were being committed. 8
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range, Co.,"9 the Supreme Court
held that even printed matter could be enjoined where it was employed as the means by which an unlawful combination was effected. The American Federation of Labor had printed the name of
the company in the "We Don't Patronize" list of its magazine, the
American Federationist.The union also sent out circulars urging
participation in a nation-wide boycott. The boycott had been enjoined by a lower court,30 and the appellants before the Supreme
Court had been found in contempt for continuing to publish the
blacklist and circulars." The union argued that such publication
could not be construed to be in violation of the injunction, because
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

208 U.S. at 301.
See text accompanying note 17 supra.
BERmAN, supra note 11, at 81-86.
Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
221 U.S. 418 (1911).
Bucks Stove & Range Co. v. Gompers, 33 App. D.C. 83 (1907).
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 516 (1909).
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to so find would place the Court in the position of abridging first
amendment rights.2 Justice Lamar, writing for the Court, rejected
this argument, 33 went on to say that the principle set down in the
DanburyHatters case was a general one, and thus made it clear that
the scope of labor's liability, in light of that decision, was broad
34
indeed.
B.

The Second Phase: Passage of the Clayton Act and Its Impact

1.

The Move to Create an Exemption for Labor

Even before the Danbury Hatters case5 was decided, concern for
labor's liability under the Sherman Act had begun to manifest itself
in the form of legislative proposals for exemption.3 6 Spurred on in
part by the decision in the Danbury Hatters case, the Democrats
took over the cause of providing labor an exemption and made it
part of their party platform in 1908.Y' It became a major issue in the
1912 national election, and was a high priority when the new Congress and the Administration of Woodrow Wilson took office . The
culmination of the movement came on October 15, 1914, when the
32.
33.
34.

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436 (1911).
Id. at 437.
Justice Lamar's exact words were as follows:
It [the principle in Danbury Hatters] covered any illegal means by which interstate
commerce is restrained, whether by unlawful combinations of capital, or unlawful
combinations of labor; and we think also whether the restraint be occasioned by unlawful contract, trusts, pooling arrangements, blacklists, boycotts, coercion, threats, intimidation, and whether these be made effective, in whole or in part, by acts, words,
or printed matter.
Id. at 438. But see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), where an anti-picketing statute
was declared invalid on first amendment grounds.
35. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
36. In all, there appear to have been twelve bills introduced in Congress prior to the
passage of the Clayton Act which would have exempted labor, to one degree or another, from
application of the Sherman Act. These were H.R. 6640, in the 52d Congress; H.R. 10,539 in
the 56th Congress; H.R. 11,667 in the 56th Congress; S. 649 and H.R. 14,947 in the 57th
Congress; S. 1728, H.R. 89, H.R. 166, and H.R. 2636 in the 52d Congress; H.R. 7938 in the
55th Congress; H.R. 11,988 in the 57th Congress; and S. 1546 in the 55th Congress. Copies of
these bills are printed in BuLs AND DzA&TEs REATrMG TO TRUsTS, S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong.,
2d Sess. 465 & 411, 469 & 449, 473 & 432, 477 & 417, 481, 581, 949, 953, 987 & 999 (1902-03).
37. Kovner, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 750 (1947).
38. Id. at 750-51.
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Sixty-Third Congress enacted into law the Clayton Act.3" For the
most part, the new legislation was aimed at tightening the antitrust
restrictions on business. Sections 6 and 20, however, were addressed
to the application of the antitrust laws to labor.
Section 6 began by stating "[t]hat the labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce"; it then went on to grant
labor unions an exemption from the antitrust laws both as to their
existence and operation. 0
Section 20 prohibited any court or judge of the United States from
issuing an order in any case "involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment . . ." unless the
party asking for the restraining order would suffer irreparable harm
to property or to a property right and had no adequate remedy at
law. 4 Section 20 also broadly defined the type of conduct of parties
to a labor dispute which could not be restrained and insulated such
conduct from being held in violation of any law of the United
States.2
In addition, § 16' 3 gave private parties the right to injunctive relief
39. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970)
and 29 U.S.C. 99 52, 53 (1970)).
40. Section 6 stated:
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731, currently 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
41. Section 20 stated in part:
That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which
injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must
be described with particularity in the application, which must be in writing and sworn
to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738, currently 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
42. The second paragraph of § 20 read as follows:
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 411

from practices which served to restrain trade." This provision,
though less obviously applicable to labor organizations, would prove
to be of no less significance in labor disputes than §§ 6 and 20.
Although §§ 6 and 20 were hailed at the time of their passage as
a long-awaited triumph for labor, careful scrutiny of the language
contained in those sections must have convinced many observers
there was room for doubt that the changes were as substantial as
popularly believed. In fact, within two years after the Clayton Act
became effective, an attorney who had distinguished himself in antitrust actions against labor unions testified before the United
States Commission on Industrial Relations that the Act had given
the unions nothing they had not already possessed.4 5
Clearly, however, Congress had intended to grant labor unions
some sort of exemption; the only question was how broad was this
exemption and how far did Congress intend to go? Section 6, for
others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such
person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain
from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so
to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such
dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably
assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing
which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; or
shall any of these acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations
of any law of the United States.
Id.
43.

Section 16 provided:
That any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections two, three, seven and eight of this Act, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss
or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings,
and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United
States, to bring suit for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the
provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen
hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 737, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
44. Previously, it had been held that only the federal government could secure an injunction under the Sherman Act. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917).
45. BERmAN, supra note 11, at 102.
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example, declared that "Nothing in the antitrust laws shall be construed . . . to forbid or restrain [labor] organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof. . . ." But what is a

"legitimate objective," and how may it be "lawfully" carried out?
What is to be inferred from the fact that in § 20, such terms as
"peaceful means," "lawfully" and "peacefully" were used with such
relentless consistency? The end result was that §§ 6 and 20 probably
raised more questions than Congress had sought to answer in enacting the new law.
Likewise, the legislative histories of §§ 6 and 20 offer little help
in removing the shroud of ambiguity which veils the true intent of
Congress. To be sure, a basic stimulus for § 6 (referred to in the
House debates as § 7) was clearly a fear that the courts might be
tempted to dissolve labor unions as unlawful combinations in restraint of trade" under §§ 1 and 4 of the Sherman Act. 7 This accounts for the explicit language in § 6 unequivocally establishing the
legality of labor organizations per se. 8 Also, it is clear from the
debates that the members of Congress felt compelled to go on record
as declaring that there is some sort of essential difference between
46.

In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 F. 512 (N.D. W. Va. 1912), a United

States district court had held that the United Mine Workers was an unlawful organization,
implying that it could be disbanded under the Sherman Act. This view was rejected on appeal

to the circuit court. Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 F. 685 (4th Cir. 1914).
47. Section 4 states:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of Sections 1 to 7 of this title; and it shall be the duty
of the several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction
of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and
praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties
complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed,
as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such
petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary
restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647 § 4, 26 Stat. 209). It
will be recalled that § 1 makes unlawful "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.
... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
48. Section 6 states:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor . . . organizations, .

.

. nor shall such organizations, or the

members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731).
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labor and commodities 49-hence the first sentence of § 6.0 It seems
likely, however, that this language was incorporated more as a gesture of ideological solidarity with the rhetoric of labor than anything
else. 1
It is also quite clear that the second paragraph of § 202 was
intended to shelter certain specific union activities (i.e., strikes and
the peaceful encouragement of others to participate in them; the
peaceful dispensation or receipt of information; boycotts directed at
"any party to such dispute" and peaceful persuasion of others to
participate in them; the payment or withholding of strike benefits;
peaceful assembly; and "any act or thing which might lawfully be
done in the absence of such dispute") from legal sanctions, including the issuance of injunctions. 3
But what of the more general language of the first paragraph of §
20?" Was that language intended to provide unions with a blanket
exemption from antitrust law injunctions? Were the activities specifically enumerated in the second paragraph of § 20 intended to be
both lawful and immune to judicial intervention via injunction
under any and all circumstances? Were §§ 6 and 20, taken together,
intended to place all union activity beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws, thereby leaving the remedy for "unlawful" activity on the part
of labor to other provisions of law? Again, the legislative debates are
less than models of clarity, but close scrutiny of the portions relating
to these questions support some interesting conclusions, particularly regarding the question of whether Congress intended to confer
on unions a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws.
These debates lend a good deal of credence to the argument that
the intent of Congress was to (1) provide labor unions with protection from judicial dissolution, and (2) proclaim the legality of and
protect from injunction the "legitimate" activities of the unions,
most or all of which were listed in the second paragraph of § 20.11
49. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 14,018 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); id. at 9086-87
(remarks of Congressman Kelly).
50. See text accompanying note 40 supra.

51.

See 51

CONG.

Rac. 13,667-68 (1914) (remarks of Senator Ashurst).

52. For text of § 20 see note 42 supra.
53. See, e.g., 51 CONG. Rzc. 13,662 (1914) (remarks of Senator Ashurst). See also H.R.
REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Seas. 30-37 (1914).
54. For text of this portion of § 20 see note 41 supra.
55. The following excerpts from the Senate debates illustrates this point.
Mr. JONES. I desire to get the views of the Senator from Kansas as to how far he
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thinks this provision of the proposed law goes. Does it go any further than recognizing
the legality of these organizations as organizations, or does it permit these organizations, after they are organized, to then go on and do things in restraint of trade and
exempt them from prosecution for such acts?
Mr. THOMPSON. I think it exempts them simply as lawful organizations; but,
of course, if they do anything unlawful or use any unlawful means, they are subject to
prosecution under the antitrustlaw and under the general laws on the subject without
regard to the antitrust law.
Mr. JONES. That is what I wanted to get at; that is about my idea with reference
to how far this provision goes.
Mr. THOMPSON. The provision only protects such organizations in the performance of lawful acts, as I understand.
Mr. JONES. It prevents the court from holding as a conspiracy [sic] in violation
of the Sherman law simply because of their organization?
Mr. THOMPSON. That is the intention, as I understand.
Mr. JONES. As I understand, that is the Senator's idea as to the extent to which
this provision goes?
Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. I saw a statement purporting to come from the President that this
provision, in effect, simply recognizes as lawful what many of the courts alreadyhold
is legal, and does not go any further; and, as I understand, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee of the other House gave out a statement to the press in which
he held the same view; in other words, as the Senator understands,this provision does
not really exempt any of these organizationsfrom prosecution for the commission of
acts which would, in fact, be in restraint of trade, and therefore prohibited by the
Sherman antitrust law, but it does recognize their right to exist as organizations;the
mere fact that they are organizations does not warrant any prosecution against them?
Mr. THOMPSON. No, nor for performing lawful acts in connection with the purposes of the organization.
Mr. JONES. Of course, they could not be prosecuted for performing lawful acts.
51 CONG. Rac. 13,847-48 (1914) (remarks of Senators Jones and Thompson) (emphasis supplied).
Even more revealing is a later exchange among Senators Culberson, Jones and West.
Mr. JONES. The point I am suggesting is this: Suppose that they do something
unlawful. Suppose they do unlawful acts, then the court could restrain them from
doing those acts.
Mr. CULBERSON. I think so, so far as this bill is concerned.
Mr. JONES. But would it not have to stop there, or could it go on and dissolve
the organization?
Mr. CULBERSON. Not in my judgment. The court would not be authorized to
dissolve the organization.
Mr. JONES. This is my point, and that is the suggestion that I am making. That,
in my judgment, is the only substantial change made by this provision in existing
conditions. Under conditions now existing the court could dissolve the organization,
while if this provision is passed and a labororganizationshould commit some unlawful
act the court could stop those unlawful acts. There it must stop and let the organization continue its existence. I think that is quite a substantial right and quite a substantial provision, but one that will not in any way interfere with interstate trade or
commerce.
Mr. WEST. Mr. President, in what way would the court stop such an organization-by fine or imprisonment?
Mr. JONES. I suppose so, or by injunction or something of that sort.
Id. at 14,017. (emphasis supplied)
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Furthermore, one need hardly rely on the familiar tool of negative
inference to conclude that activities beyond the scope of the lawful
and peaceful activities so protected were to be subject to the Sherman Act's sanctions insofar as they restrained trade. This position
is buttressed by the authorities relied on in the report of the House
5
Judiciary Committee which had reviewed the bill. " That the exemption was never intended to be total is also well supported by the
fact that an amendment which would have had precisely that effect
was soundly defeated in the House. 57
Moreover, a review of the legislative history of § 20 would be
incomplete without a glimpse at the comments on a subject that
was to provide the context for the Supreme Court's first interpretation of that section-the secondary boycott. It is clear from the
language of § 20 that boycotting of some sort was to be protected.
But was the language intended to encompass all forms of union
boycott activity? Judged by the comments of Congressman Webb
it seems as if Congress did not intend to protect the enumerated
activities in the second paragraph of § 20 under all circumstances.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-37 (1914).
The Clerk read as follows:
Strike out the first paragraph of section 7 as amended and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
"The provisions of the antitrust laws shall not apply to agricultural, labor, consumers', fraternal, or horticultural organizations, orders, or associations."
The question being taken, the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have
it.
Mr. THOMAS. Let us have a division. The committee divided; and there were ayes 70, noes 79.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed Mr. Thomas and Mr. Webb.
The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported - ayes 69, noes 105.
Accordingly the amendment was rejected.
51 CONG. REC. 9569 (1914).
58. Congressman Webb, one of the major proponents of the Clayton Bill, stated:
Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, I should vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota if I were not perfectly satisfied that it is taken care of in this
section. The language the gentlman reads does not authorize the secondary boycott,
and he could not torture it into any such meaning. While it does authorize persons to
cease to patronize the party to the dispute and to recommend to others to cease to
patronize that same party to the dispute, that is not a secondary boycott, and you can
not possibly make it mean a secondary boycott. Therefore this section does not authorize the secondary boycott.
I say again-andI speak for, I believe, practically every member of the Judiciary
Committee-that if this section did legalize the secondary boycott there would not be
a man to vote for it. It is not the purpose of the committee to authorize it, and I do
56.
57.
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At the very least, there should be little doubt that secondary boycotts were not intended to be shielded.
2.

Effect of the Clayton Act

Whatever the intended effect of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act,
it did nothing to reduce the number of antitrust actions in which a
labor organization was named as the defendant. 9 In fact, the number of such cases actually increased, a phenomenon largely attributable to the fact that § 161° allowed private injunction suits."t It has
even been suggested that the only real benefit that unions received
from the Clayton Act was freedom from the fear that they might be
dissolved as unlawful combinations in restraint of trade.2
The question of the scope of the labor exemption under §§ 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act first reached the Supreme Court in 1921, seven
3
years after passage of the Act, in Duplex PrintingCo. v. Deering1
The Duplex case involved an action for an injunction under § 161,
of the Clayton Act, authorizing courts to grant injunctions in antitrust cases to private parties. The Duplex Printing Company, one
of only four manufacturers of newspaper printing presses in the
country at the time, had been subjected to secondary boycott activities by the machinists' union in order to induce the company to sign
a union contract. 5 The petition for an injunction was denied at both
not think any person in the House wants to do it. We confine the boycotting to the
parties to the dispute, allowing parties to cease to patronize that party and to ask
others to cease to patronize the party to the dispute.
51 CONG. REc. 9658 (1914) (emphasis supplied). See also 51 CONG. REc. 9652-53 (1914) (remarks of Congressmen Webb and Volstead). Note that the portion of H.R. 15,657, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914), which dealt with the exemption of boycott activities was in the same form
after it was reported out of the Judiciary Committee as it was when finally adopted. See H.R.
REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1914).
59. It has been pointed out that of 83 cases brought against labor from 1890 to 1929, 64
(77%) were brought after the passage of the Clayton Act. BamAN, supra note 11, at 219.
60. See note 43 supra for text of § 16.
61. Of the 64 antitrust actions brought against labor from 1914 to 1929, 34 (53%) were
private injunction suits. Fully 94 percent of the private injunction suits were immediately
successful, and 82 percent of those were ultimately successful. BERMAN, supranote 11, at 219.
62. Id. at 220.
63. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of § 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat.
737).
65. Among the tactics employed by the union were:
a variety of. . . modes of preventing the sale of presses of (Duplex's) manufacture in
or about New York City, and delivery of them in interstate commerce, such as injuring
and threatening to injure (Duplex's) customers and prospective customers, and per-
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the district court"6 and circuit court 7 levels, with both decisions
relying specificially on the exemption provisions of the Clayton Act.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Pitney, reversed the lower
courts, concluding that Duplex had a "clear right to an injunction
under the Sherman Act as amended by the Clayton Act . . . .""
Interpreting § 20, Justice Pitney's opinion made three major points:
(1) that the first paragraph of § 20 was a restatement of the law of
equity;"' (2) that the use of words such as "lawful," "lawfully,"
"peaceful" and "peacefully," in reference to the dispute between
the parties, strongly rebutted an intent on the part of the legislature
to grant a general immunity to conduct that violated the antitrust
laws or any other laws;70 and (3) that the second paragraph of the
section was intended to protect from injunction and prosecution
only acts committed by those concerned as parties, i.e., the restriction upon the granting of injunctions and the relaxation of the laws
of the United States were intended to be restricted "to parties
standing in proximate relation to a controversy such as is particularly described. '"71
sons concerned in hauling, handling, or installing the presses.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1921). The other three manufacturers of printing presses had signed agreements with the union, but two of the three had
indicated that they would be compelled to terminate their union contracts unless Duplex
signed a similar agreement because otherwise they would be unable to compete. The agreements these companies had signed provided for eight hour working days and a minimum wage
scale. Duplex, on the other hand, operated on an open shop basis, and required its workers
to put in a ten hour day.
66. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 247 F. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
67. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918).
68. 254 U.S. at 478.
69. Id. at 470.
70. Id. at 473.
71. Id. at 470-71. It will perhaps facilitate an understanding of Justice Pitney's complicated but respectable logic on this point to set out that portion of his opinion in full.
The second paragraph declares that "no such restraining order or injunction" shall
prohibit certain conduct specified-manifestly still referring to a "case between an
employer and employees,. . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms
or conditions of employment," as designated in the first paragraph. It is very clear that
the restriction upon the use of the injunction is in favor only of those concerned as
parties to such a dispute as is described. The words defining the permitted conduct
include particular qualifications consistent with the general one respecting the nature
of the case and dispute intended; and the concluding words, "nor shall any of the acts
specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the
United States," are to be read in the light of the context, and mean only that those
acts are not to be so held when committed by parties concerned in "a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." If the qualifying words are to have any effect,
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With regard to secondary boycotts, Justice Pitney held that it was
a subject dealt with specifically by the statute and that the language of the statute limited the pressure that could be applied to a
party in a labor dispute to "peaceful and lawful" means of influencing neutrals. He then concluded that "peaceful and lawful" means
of persuasion did not include the instigation of a sympathy strike
in support of a secondary boycott.72
In effect, the Duplex decision restricted the exemptions of § 20 to
cases where the union's activity was directed against the employer
with whom a dispute over terms and conditions of employment had
arisen. For authority on this point, Justice Pitney relied in large part
on the legislative debates. 3 There can be little question but that
Justice Pitney's interpretations of the language of § 20 were persuasive, perhaps even compelling. In sum, his construction of the
Clayton Act could hardly be assailed as patently unreasonable.
Nevertheless, the Duplex decision incurred the wrath of labor leaders and the guardians of their interests in Congress. It was this
decision that sowed the seeds of discontent which would one day
bear fruit in the form of substantial legislative restrictions on judicial equity powers. 7
they must operate to confine the restriction upon the granting of injunctions, and also
the relaxation of the provisions of the anti-trust and other laws of the United States,
to parties standing in proximate relation to a controversy such as is particularly described.
Id. Further insight into Justice Pitney's reasoning may be gained from the following excerpt
which appears at a somewhat later point in his opinion:
Section 20 must be given full effect according to its terms as an expression of the
purpose of Congress; but it must be borne in mind that the section imposes an exceptional and extraordinary restriction upon the equity powers of the courts of the United
States and upon the general operation of the anti-trust laws, a restriction in the nature
of a special privilege or immunity to a particular class, with corresponding detriment
to the general public; and it would violate rules of statutory construction having
general application and far-reaching importance to enlarge that special privilege by
resorting to a loose construction of the section, not to speak of ignoring or slighting the
qualifying words that are found in it. Full and fair effect will be given to every word if
the exceptional privilege be confined-as the natural meaning of the words confines
it-to those who are proximately and substantially concerned as parties to an actual
dispute respecting the terms or conditions of their own employment, past, present, or
prospective. The extensive construction adopted by the majority of the court below
virtually ignores the effect of the qualifying words. Congress had in mind particular
industrial controversies, not a general class war.
Id. at 471-72.
72. .d. at 473-74.
73. Id. at 475, 476-77 n.1. See notes 56 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 114-27 infra.
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A second case worthy of mention at this point is Coronado Coal
Co. v. UMW,75 which came up before the Supreme Court on two
occasions. The Coronado case involved an action for damages incurred when the defendant union, angry because one of Coronado's
mine operators was using non-union men, attacked plaintiff's coal
mining facility in Arkansas, killing some non-union employees and
blowing up plaintiff's mines. The first Coronado decision" reaffirmed the suability of unions,7 7 relying in part on § § 7 and 8 of the
Sherman Act. 7 The Court, noting that there was evidence to the
effect that the national union had a policy of pressing for unionization of non-union mines "not only as a direct means of bettering the
conditions and wages of their workers, but also as a means of lessening interstate competition for union operators . . . ."," concluded
that the use of unlawful means to accomplish such an end would
clearly violate the antitrust laws.10 Finding insufficient evidence to
prove the utilization of unlawful means on the part of the national
union itself, the Court dismissed the part of the complaint alleging
national UMW involvement in a conspiracy to restrain interstate
trade.8 ' The local union, whose men had been involved in the attacks on the Coronado mines, was found to have been motivated by
strictly local considerations. As to the effects of the local's acts, the
Court, contrasting this case to the Danbury Hatters case" and several others where interstate commerce had been the direct object of
union activities, held that coal mining, in and of itself, is not interstate commerce, and, therefore, the union activity was not a restraint of commerce, unless it was intended to restrain the flow of
coal in commerce or that intent could reasonably be inferred because of the direct and substantial effect on commerce.8s
The case was remanded to the district court, where a verdict was
directed for the defendant union, and the circuit court affirmed. 4
75. 268 U.S. 295 (1925); 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
76. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
77. Id. at 392.
78. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 § 7, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (repealed by Act of July
7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283). Section 8 of the Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
79. 259 U.S. at 408.
80. Id. at 408-09.
81. Id. at 409.
82. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
83. 259 U.S. at 410-11.
84. Finley v. UMW, 300 F. 972 (8th Cir. 1924).
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the second Coronado case5 involved almost exclusively factual questions, but the Court did provide further insight into its views as to the application of the antitrust laws. It stated that prevention of manufacture or production
by illegal or tortious conduct is generally an indirect and remote
restraint of commerce, even if there is a reduction in the supply of
an article. But, if it could be shown that there was also an intent to
affect commerce, by controlling the supply or by affecting the price
of an article, the conduct would be directly violative of the antitrust
8
laws.
Based on this conclusion, the Supreme Court held that sufficient
evidence had been adduced at the second trial to make out a prima
facie case for an intent on the part of the local union to restrain
interstate trade. 7 The case was remanded to the district court, and
was later settled.8
The most significant contribution of the Coronado cases was the
identification of a two-fold test for determining whether an interruption of production within a state (that could not, itself, be classified as interstate commerce) would violate the Sherman Act: (1)
Was there intent to restrain interstate trade? (2) Was there an actual restraint on interstate commerce substantial enough to necessitate the inference of the requisite intent? 8' The question, addressed
most directly in the second Coronado case-under what circumstances reduction in the supply of a product, manufactured intrastate to be shipped into interstate commerce, could be construed to
be an antitrust violation-was elaborated upon somewhat by the
Court in Leather Workers Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.10
That Court stated that illegal interference with the manufacture of
an article constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce only
when there was an intent to affect commerce or the necessary effect
of the activity was to allow a monopolization of the supply, a control
85. Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
86. Id. at 310.
87. Id.
88. The settlement was for $27,500. If the damages asked for had been granted and
trebled, the unions would have been compelled to pay over $2 million. BERAN, supra note
11, at 128-29.
89. For an application of this test see UMW v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18
F.2d 839, 844-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 536 (1927).
90. 265 U.S. 457 (1924).
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over price or discrimination between customers."
In United States v. Brims," decided about a year later, the Supreme Court rendered its first decision in which it subjected an
ordinary trade agreement to the standards of the Sherman Act. This
case foreshadowed the line of later cases going off on a finding of a
"conspiracy with a non-labor group" which will be discussed
below. 3 The Brims case involved an allegation of criminal conspiracy among manufacturers of millwork, building contractors and
members of the carpenters' union in Chicago, who had entered into
an agreement providing that manufacturers and contractors were to
hire only union carpenters, and the carpenters, in turn, were to
refuse to install millwork not produced under union conditions. The
Supreme Court, per Justice McReynolds, found that among the
incentives for the agreement had been the desire on the part of the
manufacturers to eliminate competition from non-union mills which
had been underselling them, that the parties to the agreement had
intended to reduce such competition and had been successful in
doing so, and that the local manufacturers had thereby increased
their profits. Since part of the non-union millwork had come into
the Chicago market through interstate commerce, the evidence was
held sufficient by the Court to uphold the convictions of the parties
to the agreement for violating § 1 of the Sherman Act. 4
In 1927, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone CuttersAssociation." This case has
been referred to as one of the most important cases of the postClayton/pre-Norris-LaGuardia era, owing in large part to the fact
that it did much to rekindle union criticism of judicial interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts." The case involved a suit
for an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 7 brought on behalf
of several companies in the business of quarrying and fabricating
limestone, largely for construction purposes, against the Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association of North America (hereinafter "the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
737).

Id. at 471.
272 U.S. 549 (1926).
See text accompanying notes 150-59 and 169-228 infra.
272 U.S. at 552-53.
274 U.S. 37 (1927).
See BEamAN, supra note 11, at 170.
29 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat.
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Association"), a union representing mechanics in the stone-cutting
trade. When the plaintiffs had terminated agreements with the Association, effectively locked out its members, and reinstituted operations under agreements with unaffiliated unions, the Association
responded by issuing a nation-wide directive to all its members
stating that they were to rigidly adhere to a rule forbidding them
to work on stone "that has been started-planed, turned, cut or
semi-finished-by men working in opposition to our organization
''98

This, in effect, established a powerful nation-wide secondary boycott against the stone companies' product, since virtually all stoneworkers employed on buildings where such stone was used were
members of the Association. Strikes against employers using the
stone produced by Bedford and the other companies in the suit had
been effectively initiated and sustained at the instigation of the
Association's national organization, in some cases against the will
of the local unions involved, and even where there had been no other
dispute with the struck employer.9 Justice Sutherland, writing for
the Court, found this to be activity, the primary aim and necessary
consequence of which had been to restrain the interstate sale and
shipment of the stone produced by the companies seeking the injunction.' ® According to Justice Sutherland, since interstate commerce had been the direct object of attack in the union's activities,
it did not alter the character of the conspiracy that the means employed would otherwise have been, in themselves, lawful.' 0 ' Justice
Sutherland further held that the fact that the union had been ultimately in pursuit of legitimate objectives was not determinative:
A restraint of interstate commerce cannot be justified by the
fact that the ultimate object of the participants was to secure
an ulterior benefit which they might have been at liberty to
pursue by means not involving such restraint.10
Relying heavily upon Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,""
98. 274 U.S. at 42.
99. Id. at 43-45.
100. Id. at 46.
101. Id. at 46-47.
102. Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
103. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Justice Sutherland also cited with approval United States v.
Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); and
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (the Danbury Hatters case).
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Justice Sutherland concluded that the plaintiffs in the Bedford
Stone case were entitled to injunctive relief, notwithstanding the
proscriptions of § 20 of the Clayton Act, where a secondary boycott
had been employed." 4
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, dissented'0 5 on the
grounds that the union, insofar as it had restrained interstate commerce at all, had not imposed any unreasonablerestraint. The factors enumerated by Justice Brandeis in determining the reasonableness of the union's restraints on interstate commerce should be
briefly noted since they form the most desirable basis for evaluating
the antitrust implication of labor union conduct, despite the fact
that they have never received the imprimatur of a majority of the
Supreme Court. The factors considered by Justice Brandeis were as
follows:
(1) that the individual union members did not have contracts
either with the plaintiffs or with their customers, and the
strikes therefore did not involve any breach of contract; 6
(2) that the plaintiffs were not "weak employers opposed by a
mighty union";'"7
(3) that the means employed by the union members were not,
of themselves, illegal (i.e., they did not engage in trespass,
picketing, violence, intimidation, fraud, threats, obstruction
of attempts to secure other help on the part of the plaintiffs
or their customers, etc.) ;105

(4) that the combination complained of involved only members
of the same craft, sought to promote only the legitimate
interests of the craft's members, and had acted only defensively. 0 '
In addition to the Supreme Court cases, there were, in the fifteen
or so years after the passage of the Clayton Act, a considerable
number of circuit and district court decisions finding certain union
activities to be unlawful restraints of trade. As a general rule, the
union conduct that was susceptible to such a finding fell into the
following broad categories:
104. Justice Sanford concurred, in a separate opinion, relying on the Duplex case. Justice
Stone likewise concurred in a separate opinion, also finding Duplex to be controlling.
105. 274 U.S. at 56-65.
106. Id. at 58-59.
107. Id. at 59.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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interference with interstate transportation or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce;" '
interference with the production of goods which were intended for interstate commerce;"' and
interference with the sale, installation or use of goods which
had passed through interstate commerce." 2

All of these cases served as grist for the mill of labor officials,
lobbyists and sympathizers. Perhaps even more significant, from
the political point of view, is the fact that the courts, in addition to
construing the labor exemption narrowly, were given to issuing extremely broad injunctions against unions where there was a finding
of an unlawful restraint of trade."3 These cases, along with a very
dedicated and well organized labor lobby in Washington, eventually
served to prod Congress into action.
C. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct and the Revolution In Judicial
Attitudes
1. Congress Moves to Limit Judicial Equity Powers
As a result of considerable agitation by and among labor unions,
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act"' in 1932 to limit federal
110. See, e.g., Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa.
1929) (trucker prevented by pickets from transporting steel billets across state line); Vandell
v. United States, 6 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1925) (railroad tracks dynamited); Williams v. United
States, 295 F. 302 (5th Cir. 1923) (convictions of strikers for putting quicksilver in locomotive
boilers); United States v. Norris, 255 F. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1918) (strikers prevented from unloading of sand, which had been shipped from another state, from railroad cars.)
111. See, e.g., UMW v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927)
(interference with mining operation); Dail Overload Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 F. 171
(N.D. Ohio 1919) (strikers interfered with automobile production); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
Machinists Dist. Lodge 9, 252 F. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (strikers interfered with munitions
production). But see Leather Workers Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457
(1924) (interference by strikers with further production of goods that were intended for interstate commerce held no violation where there was no attempted or actual interference with
the transportation and delivery of products in interstate commerce).
112. See, e.g., Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 18 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1927) (refusal to work on buildings using stone cut by non-union labor); Boyle v. United
States, 259 F. 803 (7th Cir. 1919) (trade agreement whereby manufacturer agreed not to hire
non-union labor and union members agreed not to install non-union appliances). But see
Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F.2d 560 (S.D.N.Y.), af/'d, 29 F.2d 679 (2nd Cir. 1928) (injunction
to compel union workers to work in same building with non-union workers denied even though
product being installed had passed through interstate commerce).
113. See, e.g., the restraining orders quoted in BEarAN, supra note 11, at 141-42, 178.
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, §§ 115, 47 Stat. 70).
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courts with respect to the issuance of injunctions in cases arising out
of a labor dispute. To fully understand the significance of this action, it is best to begin by examining the public policy which Congress sought to clearly define in § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."'
In language carefully chosen to, in the words of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, "assist the courts in the proper interpretation of the
proposed legislation,""' the Congress declared:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed
with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property
to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free
to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be
free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection; therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the
United States are enacted."'
One derives the impression that much of the impetus for this new
legislation came from the clear absurdities arising out of judicial
injunctive enforcement of the notorious "yellow dog" contracts"'
which had become relatively commonplace. Nevertheless, it is also
115. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
116. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932). See also 75 CONG. REC. 4503 (1932)
(remarks of Senator Norris).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
118. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1932); 75 CONG. REc. 5479
(1932) (remarks of Congressman La Guardia); id. at 4626 (remarks of Senator Norris). A
typical "yellow dog" contract as quoted in these congressional debates read as follows:
The undersigned applicant for employment by the Great Northern Railway Co. as
(or at present employed), in consideration of the granting or continuance of
such employment, hereby states and represents to the Great Northern Railway Co.
that he is not a member of or affiliated with the International Association of Machinists; the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers
of America; the International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths and Helpers; the Amalga-
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clear that there was general dissatisfaction with judicial practice in
the area of labor injunctions."'
Both Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering20 and Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. JourneymanStone Cutters'Association21were cited as
examples of judicial decisions militating in favor of the new legislation. Section 4 of the Act' 2 was aimed directly at correcting what
was seen as judicial misapprehension as to the true import of § 20
mated Sheet Metal Workers International Alliance; the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers; or the Brotherhood or Railway Carmen of America, and agrees that
during the entire period of such employment he will not apply for membership in, or
become a member of, or affiliate with, or lend any support, financial or otherwise, to
any of said organizations. Upon the failure of the undersigned to comply with the
foregoing agreement in every respect, it is agreed that this may be treated by the Great
Northern Railway Co. as a resignation from its employment and that such employment
shall immediately cease.
Id.
119. The fact that Congress was very unhappy with the interpretations that had been
placed upon the labor exemption provisions of the Clayton Act was perhaps best exemplified
by the following excerpt from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report:
The purpose of the (Norris-La-Guardia) bill is to protect the rights of labor in the same
manner the Congress intended when it enacted the Clayton Act, October 15, 1914 (38
Stat. 738), which act, by reason of its construction and application by the Federal
courts, is ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent.
S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). See also 75 CONG. REc. 4619'(1932) (remarks
of Senator Blaine).
120. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
121. 274 U.S. 37 (1927). See text accompanying notes 95-112 supra.
122. The section contains the following provisions:
§ 4. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer
organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section
3 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested
in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other
moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor
dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any
court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute;
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of the Clayton Act,' forbidding the issuance of an injunction in
several enumerated situations, some of which corresponded to those
listed in § 20 of the Clayton Act. Thus, § 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act stated:
§5. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
upon the ground that any of the persons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert
of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of this title.'2 4
This section was specifically conceived to overrule part of the
2
Bedford Stone holding. 1
The final section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which is relevant
to the present discussion is § 13,121 which sought to define the key
terms-"labor dispute," "person participating in a labor dispute"
and "case involving or growing out of a labor dispute." Of particular
interest is § 13(c) which states:
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or condi(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore
specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the
acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described
in section 3 [relating to "yellow dog" contracts] of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70).
123. The House Judiciary Committee .had this to say about the rationale behind Section
4:
These are the same character of acts which Congress and section 20 of the Clayton
Act of October 15, 1913, sought to restrict from the operation of injunctions, but
because of the interpretations placed by the courts on this section of the Clayton Act,
the restrictions as contained herein have become more or less valueless to labor, and
this section is intended by more specific language to overcome the qualifying effects
of the decisions of the courts in this respect.
H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 5, 47
Stat. 70).
125. H.R. RaP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Seas. 8 (1932).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 13, 47
Stat. 73).
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tions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and
27
employee. 1
2.

Early Effects of Norris-LaGuardia

When read in conjunction with § 4, § 13(c) essentially placed
secondary boycotts and strikes beyond the reach of injunctive relief.
This at least was the view taken in 1940 by the Supreme Court in
2
Milk Wagon Drivers'Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products,Inc. , 1
2 9
Earlier that year, in the case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
some early signs of the revolution in judicial thinking, sparked in
part at least by the passage of Norris-LaGuardia, had begun to
emerge. The Court in Apex emphasized the fact that labor's exemption under the Clayton Act was less than total, 3 ' but it refused to
hold that a violent local sit-down strike, in which union members
had knowingly obstructed the flow of the company's goods into interstate commerce, was the kind of restraint of trade contemplated
and proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman Act.' 3 ' Apex was an action for
treble damages, and the Court's decision did not rest directly on the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is nevertheless apparent that the opinion
relied in part on Norris-LaGuardia for its conclusion that an obstruction of commerce, such as the one involved in that case, was
not considered by Congress to contravene the public policy embodied in the Sherman Act.' 32 But beyond the narrow holding in the
case, a general predisposition to find labor union activities to be
beyond the Sherman Act's scope is intimated by the Apex deci33
sion.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
128. 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
129. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
130. Id. at 487-88.
131. Id. at 493. Later in the same opinion the Court stated:
It is in this sense that it is said that the restraints, actual or intended, prohibited by
the Sherman Act are only those which are so substantial as to affect market prices.
Restraints on competition or on the course of trade in the merchandising of articles
moving in interstate commerce is not enough, unless the restraint is shown to have or
is intended to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competition.
Id. at 500-01 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 504 n.24.
133. Consider, for example, the following language from the Apex opinion:
If, without such effects on the market, we were to hold that a local factory strike,
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Just how dramatic an impact on judicial thinking the NorrisLaGuardia Act was likely to have did not become clear until a year
later in the case of United States v. Hutcheson.13 ' That case involved criminal indictments brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act
in connection with a jurisdictional dispute between the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and the International Association of Machinists, both affiliates of the American
Federation of Labor. The two unions had long been at odds over
which of them could claim jurisdiction over positions responsible for
the erection and dismantling of certain machinery. AnheuserBusch, the employer involved in the dispute, had agreements with
stopping production and shipment of its product interstate, violates the Sherman law,
practically every strike in modem industry would be brought within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, under the Sherman Act, to remedy local law violations. The Act
was plainly not intended to reach such a result, its language does not require it, and
the course of our decisions precludes it. The maintenance in our federal system of a
proper distribution between state and national governments of police authority and of
remedies private and public for public wrongs is of far-reaching importance. An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to Congress. The Sherman Act
is concerned with the character of the prohibited restraints and with their effect on
interstate commerce. It draws no distinction between the restraints effected by violence and those achieved by peaceful but oftentimes quite as effective means. Restraints not within the Act, when achieved by peaceful means, are not brought within
its sweep merely because, without other differences, they are attended by violence.
Id. at 513.
The thrust of the Apex decision, in fact, revealed for the first time (notwithstanding the
claim that the decision fully comported with past rulings by the Court) a willingness on the
part of the Court to find no Sherman Act liability even where there had been some restraint
of trade and the Clayton Act exemptions were inapplicable, as the following language clearly
demonstrates:
These cases show that activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit in
all of them is recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police interstate
transportation, or to afford a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable under state law,
and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose
and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity, such as to "monopolize the
supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers." These
elements of restraint of trade, found to be present in the Second Coronado case and
alone to distinguish it from the First Coronado case and the Leather Workers case, are
wholly lacking here. We do not hold that conspiracies to obstruct or prevent transportation in interstate commerce can in no circumstances be violations of the Sherman
Act. Apart from the Clayton Act it makes no distinction between labor and non-labor
cases. We only hold now, as we have previously held both in labor and non-labor cases,
that such restraints are not within the Sherman Act unless they are intended to have,
or in fact have, the effects on the market on which the Court relied to establish
violation in the Second Coronado case.
Id. at 512.
134. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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both unions which provided that the disputed jobs would be assigned to the machinists, and that the carpenters would submit all
grievances to arbitration. In 1939, the carpenters demanded the
disputed jobs, and Anheuser-Busch refused, requesting that the
question be submitted to arbitration. The carpenters refused the
request to arbitrate, and called a strike which involved picketing (of
Anheuser-Busch and some allied construction companies that were
also involved) and a request, publicized through circulars, letters
and the carpenters' official publication, that union members refrain
from buying Anheuser-Busch beer.
It was perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court sustained
the district court's dismissal of the charges contained in the indictments, since the union activity was entirely peaceful, directed at the
primary employer and clearly protected by § 20 of the Clayton
Act. 135 In addition, the charges were brought against four officers of
13
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. It
would seem elementary that such charges could not have been sustained even under the standard of Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering,137 which held that, under § 20 of the Clayton Act, the laws
of the United States (including, of course, the antitrust laws) were
to be relaxed only as to "parties standing in proximate relation to a
controversy".'3 Surely the officers of the carpenters enjoyed such a
relationship to the dispute their union had with the machinists and
Anheuser-Busch. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to rule
on that question, choosing instead to venture off into uncharted
and, to say the least, unconventional judicial waters. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, declared that there was no need to
determine the legality of the conduct within the restrictions set
forth in Duplex, because Congress' definition of "labor dispute" in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act left no room for doubt. 139 He went on to
say that it would be "strange indeed" if these acts were permitted
to be subject to criminal liability in view of the elaborate congressional effort to permit such conduct by not allowing it to be enjoined.'"
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 233.
United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mo. 1940).
254 U.S. 443 (1921). See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
Id. at 470-71. See also note 71 supra.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-34 (1941).
Id. at 235.
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Justice Frankfurter's statement that it would be "strange indeed"
if that which could not be reached in equity could nevertheless carry
the possibility of criminal liability strikes an ironic note when considered in the light of both the language and legislative history of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. First, with only some unrelated exceptions, ,4' the Act makes no attempt to alter substantive criteria for
legality. Its language restricts it, instead, to limitations on judicial
practice with regard to the issuance of injunctions.' 42 But more basic
than that is the underlying intent of Congress. The committee reports of both the House'l and Senate'44 are devoid of any indication
that Congress thought that, by placing some conduct beyond the
reach of injunctions, those acts would necessarily become legal in
all situations. Moreover, the debates in both houses reveal a concern
with the injunctive process. The only times that criminal and ordinary civil liability were even mentioned disclose what appears to
have been a consensus that the legislation under consideration
would leave such liability unaffected.'45
One must wonder why Justice Frankfurter and a majority of the
Supreme Court felt compelled to cast aside the time-honored judicial tradition of refusing to break new legal ground when the facts
of the Hutcheson case brought it within established precedent.'46
141. Section 3 [29 U.S.C. § 103 (1970)] makes "yellow dog" contracts unenforceable.
Section 6 [29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970)] goes to the question of vicarious liability of individuals
and organizations involved in a labor dispute.
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), which provides:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of
this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.
143. H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Seas. (1932).
144. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
145. Consider, for example, the remarks of Congressman Celler, a major proponent of the
legislation in the House:
All we do by the passage of this bill is to follow the English practice and relegate
the disputants to the criminal side of the law and to actions for damages. Only in rare
cases do we allow injunctions in this bill.
75 CONG. REc. 5490 (1932). Also worthy of note in this regard are the remarks of Congressman
Greenwood:
Most of these cases can be tried in the criminal side of the court and there is no desire
and no provision in this bill in any way to hinder the administration of the criminal
law.
Id. at 5467.
146. See 312 U.S. at 237 (Stone, J., concurring).
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Why did Justice Frankfurter, in the name of "reading the Sherman
Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as
a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct,""' adopt a construction that flies in the face of the literal meaning of NorrisLaGuardia, and radically opposes clear evidence of the legislative
intent."1 The only conceivable answer seems to be that the rebuke
that Congress handed the judiciary in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
evoked a judicial overreaction, with ramifications far beyond the
intended target of the rebuke. 49
Although the Court had construed the labor exemption very
broadly in the Hutcheson case, it was clear that there had to be
limits on its scope. In fact, the Court in Hutcheson qualified its
holding in an important respect, as follows:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under §20
are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the
wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means.'
In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, "5' the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Black, in effect upheld its pre-Norris-LaGuardia decision
in United States v. Brims,"2 by ruling that acts by labor unions,
done in combination with non-labor groups, which serve to restrain
trade, are beyond the limits of the labor exemption and subject to
the sanctions of the Sherman Act. The case was concerned with
union activities in the New York City area which had culminated
in "industry-wide understandings, looking not merely to terms and
147. 312 U.S. at 231.
148. This question is especially enigmatic when contemplated in light of the fact that
Justice Frankfurter had once expressed opposition to a proposed provision stating that activities which could not be enjoined under § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia should also not be "unlawful."
Pointing to the difficulties such a provision would create, he said: "it is one thing... merely
to withdraw the remedy of injunction for a given act; it is a wholly different thing to take
away all remedies, including a civil action for damages . . ." Kadish, Labor and the Law,
in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 171-72 n.92 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill. 1941), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. International Hod Carriers, 313 U.S. 539 (1941) (per curiam).
150. 312 U.S. at 232 (emphasis supplied).
151. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
152. 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
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conditions of employment but also to price and market control".'53
Justice Black, obviously concerned about unions aiding and abetting businesses in market control or other monopolistic practices,,54
held that such activity could not qualify for the exemption, even
though the means employed by a particular union might fall
squarely within the "specified acts" of § 20 of the Clayton Act.' 5
Justice Black remarked:
Our holding means that the same labor union activities may
or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups.' 6
Interestingly, Allen Bradley involved a suit for an injunction
brought by a private party. In his discussion of the applicability of
the labor exemption, Justice Black confined himself almost entirely
to the terms of § 20 of the Clayton Act. He did not see fit to justify
his apparent finding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not forbid
the issuance of an injunction, despite the fact that he explicitly
rejected the district court's sole reason-that the case did not in8
volve a "labor dispute"' 5 7-for finding the Act inapplicable.'
The existence of this apparent gap in the Court's reasoning is
probably attributable in part to the intricacy and difficulty of the
task it had set for itself. Justice Black defined the task as trying to
reconcile two conflicting congressional policies, one seeking a com153. 325 U.S. at 799-800. The facts of the Allen Bradley case have been very aptly summarized as follows:
Local 3 of the IBEW, having jurisdiction only over metropolitan New York City,
organized the employees of most of the electrical equipment manufacturers and contractors in the area. Under the collective agreements, the contractors agreed to buy
electrical equipment only from manufacturers in contractual relations with Local 3,
i.e. those in New York City, while the manufacturer agreed to sell only to those area
contractors who employed members of Local 3. The union, through the usual weapons
of picketing and boycotts, prevented nonunion operations. Sheltered from competition,
the manufacturers were able to raise their prices, while the contractors, with the
union's blessing and participation, could rig bids. The result was higher wages and
shorter hours for Local 3's members, greater profits for the manufacturers and contractors, exclusion for outsiders and monopolistic prices for the public.
Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to
Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 45 (1963).
154. 325 U.S. at 808-11.
155. Id. at 807.
156. Id. at 810.
157. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 51 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
158. 325 U.S. at 807 n.12 (1945).
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petitive business economy and the other seeking to allow workers to
better their position through collective bargaining. He felt that the
Court had to determine how much Congress intended one policy to
"neutralize" the other. 5 '
But another source of problems was the fact that Congress, in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, had legislated categorically (unless, of
course, considerable weight is given to the statement of policy in §
2, a practice which has received little if any overt recognition in the
judicial decisions). In the shadow of this, there was a natural temptation among the judiciary to interpret the law in the same spirit,
as the Court did in Hutcheson. But to so interpret the law in every
situation would inevitably have led to absurd results. Cornered between the irresistable force of the categorical reasoning in
Hutcheson and the patently illogical results that it would have
yielded on the facts in Allen Bradley, it is understandable that the
Court would choose to invent an exception to the evidently absolute
proscription in the language of §§ 4 and 5 of Norris-LaGuardia.
Given this much, one begins to see the real source of difficulty. The
problem, as very perceptively posited by Justice Black, was one of
reconciliationof two sometimes incompatible policies. As a probable result of a judicial tendency toward some rigidity of thought,
however, the Court's decisions in both Hutcheson and Allen Bradley
look more like the annihilationof one policy for the other on a caseby-case basis. Nevertheless, both cases were destined to exert powerful influence upon the subsequent history of the labor exemption.

II.

RECENT CASE LAW: ELABORATION ON POST NORRIS-LAGUARDIA
TRENDS

A.

Los Angeles Meat Drivers Local 626 v. United States'60

Expanding somewhat upon the doctrine of Allen Bradley, in 1962
the Court allowed partial dissolution of a labor union as an antitrust
remedy in the L.A. Meat Drivers case. The defendants in the action,
brought by the Government to secure injunctive relief against alleged violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, had stipulated to all
allegations of wrongdoing, to the ultimate conclusion that theirs was
an unlawful combination in restraint of interstate trade and com159.
160.

Id. at 806.
371 U.S. 94 (1962).
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merce, and to the propriety of the issuance of a broad injunction
against their activities.'' As Justices Goldberg and Brennan said,
"These concessions necessarily forfeit any antitrust exemption
which might otherwise have been claimed to attach."'6 2
Briefly stated, the facts as stipulated by the defendants were as
follows: that so-called "grease peddlers" were independent entrepreneurs whose earnings consisted of the difference between the
price for which they purchased restaurant grease and the price at
which they sold it to processors; that most of the grease peddlers in
Los Angeles joined the Meat Drivers Union at the instigation of the
union's business agent for the purpose of increasing their profit
margin; that this purpose was accomplished by the enforcement of
pre-agreed price levels by union agents who used or threatened to
use union economic power, including strikes and boycotts, against
processors who resisted the price-fixing scheme; that the union business agent assigned accounts and territories to each grease peddler
who was a member of the union; and that each individual grease
peddler agreed to refrain from buying from or soliciting customers
in the territory of another peddler, upon pain of suspension from the
union. It was also established that the grease peddlers were treated
as a separate group within the union, administered separately, and
that there was apparently no real or potential wage or job competition between the grease peddlers and the other union members. On
appeal, the only question was whether the district court order compelling the union to expel the grease peddlers from its membership
should be allowed to stand." 3 The Supreme Court answered in the
affirmative.
Relying upon Allen Bradley, the Court held that the case did not
arise out of a labor dispute, but merely involved an unlawful combination between businessmen and a union to restrain trade. The
Court, therefore, concluded that neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act
nor the exemption provisions of the Clayton Act were applicable., 4
The Court indicated, however, that had the union been motivated
by a "legitimate interest" in the solicitation of the grease peddlers'
membership. (i.e., if there had been "job or wage competition or
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

95-96.
105 (Goldberg & Brennan, J.J., concurring).
96-98.
102.
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economic interrelationship of any kind between the grease peddlers
and other members of the . . . union"),'" the antitrust sanctions
would not have been available.' Justice Goldberg and Justice
Brennan, in a separate concurring opinion, sought to emphasize
what was only suggested by the majority opinion, stating:
Today's opinion of the Court thus properly notes that a labor
organization may "often have a legitimate interest in soliciting
self-employed entrepreneurs as members" and recognizes that
permissible union interest and action extends beyond job and
wage competition to other "economic interrelationship[s]." 7
Except for the unusual remedy, this case probably added very
little to the law. Presumably, the incentive for the Meat Drivers
Union to seek the membership of the grease peddlers was the desire
to increase the number of dues-paying members-a purely pecuniary motivation. In Allen Bradley, a real motivation for the union
activities involved was apparently work and salary level maintenance. It can hardly be gainsaid that these are illegitimate union
objectives. It may be that the talk of "legitimate objectives" in both
cases was an empty gesture, shrouding what has been referred to as
"unprincipled" judicial decision making. 1" It is, however, obvious
that union combinations with non-labor groups which restrain trade
have tended to evoke a very strong, negative reaction on the part of
the Supreme Court.
B.

UMW v. Pennington'

The Pennington case, decided on the same day 7 ' as its sister case,
Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,'' suggested some very
interesting expansions on the Allen Bradley rule. The United Mine
Workers had brought suit against the owners of Phillips Brothers
Coal Company, a small coal producer, for welfare fund payments
allegedly due under its collective bargaining agreement with Phillips. The company then counterclaimed for treble damages, claim165. Id. at 103.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 104 (Goldberg & Brennan, J.J., concurring).
168. Winter, Collective Bargainingand Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 58 (1963).
169. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
170. June 7, 1965.
171. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See text accompanying notes 186-203 infra.
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ing that the union had violated § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by
combining with certain large coal producers to drive the smaller
producers from the market. Specifically, Phillips charged that the
Mine Workers had agreed with the large companies to, among other
things, insist upon the same wages and benefit levels in collective
bargaining with all mine operators in the industry, knowing that
some of the smaller operators would be unable to comply with the
demands and continue to survive economically. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice White, concluded that such union activity did
not qualify for exemption from the antitrust laws. "2
Justice Douglas, writing in a separate opinion on behalf of himself
and Justices Black and Clark, read the majority opinion as a mere
reaffirmation of the rule in Allen Bradley. 7 3 A close reading of Justice White's language, however, suggests more than a simple restatement of a long established rule. For one thing, the National
Labor Relations Act"' was introduced as a new element in the equation which would seek to balance, as Justice Black put it in Allen
Bradley, the need to "preserve a competitive business economy"
against the need to "preserve the rights of labor to organize to better
its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining". 7 5 In this
regard, Justice White first characterized the Court's concern and
then cautioned:
Unquestionably the Board's demarcation of the bounds of the
duty to bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the
sweep of labor's antitrust immunity, for we are concerned here
with harmonizing the Sherman Act with the national policy
expressed in the National Labor Relations Act of promoting
"the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting
labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
negotiation" . . . But there are limits to what a union or an
employer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not76 mean that the agreement
reached may disregard other laws.
172. 381 U.S. at 661.
173. Id. at 672 (Douglas, Black & Clark, J.J., concurring).
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970).
175. 325 U.S. at 806. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
176. 381 U.S. at 665 (citation omitted). It should be noted that although Justice White is
referring to the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, at the time of Allen Bradley
unions were under no duty to bargain in good faith. This requirement was added in 1947 by
the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§
141-88 (1970).
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Subtle though the distinction may be between this language and
"reading the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor
conduct",' it may nevertheless represent a nascent recognition of
substantial changes in historical conditions which should influence
the weight to be given the various factors regulating the scope of the
labor exemption. 78
Perhaps the most striking innovation in the Pennington majority
opinion, however, is embodied in the following sentence:
From the viewpoint of antitrust policy, moreover, all such
agreements between a group of employers and a union that the
union will seek specified labor standards outside the bargaining
unit suffer from a more basic defect, without regard to predatory intention or effect in the particular case.17
Justice White argued that the "salient characteristic of such
agreements" is the loss of freedom with respect to bargaining policy.
He further argued that "[iut is just such restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice and
discretion that run counter to antitrust policy."'' 0 This position
could lead to interesting results. If a union were to agree with employer A to seek certain standards in collective bargaining in another unit, this presumably would violate the antitrust laws regardless of whether the imposition of uniform standards carried any
actual, or even intended disadvantage for employer B. In fact, in
some instances, such an agreement might actually serve to enhance
competition, since a union settlement with employer B for substantially lesser terms might permit employer A to be undersold and
even driven out of business. On the other hand, a union plan to
unilaterally impose uniform standards on an industry, even with the
express purpose of driving certain competitors from the market,
would presumably be sheltered under the labor exemption panoply. 8' If one focuses on the process employed by Justice White (i.e.
balancing the national labor policy against the antitrust laws), it is
arguable that such unilateral union conduct might be reachable
177. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
178. For further discussion of this point see text accompanying notes 277-92 infra.
179. 381 U.S. at 668 (emphasis supplied).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 665 n.2.
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under the Sherman Act to the extent it also contravened the labor
laws and violated national labor policy." 2 Until a decision is handed
down which refutes the apparent trend in earlier decisions 8 3 to find
an absolute exemption for unilateral union behavior, however, the
probability of the Court reaching such a conclusion is doubtful.
Two other refinements on the Allen Bradley doctrine which appear in the Pennington decision deserve mention: (a) that wage
agreements between a union and multi-employer groups are exempt
from the antitrust laws, as is any attempt by the union to obtain
the same terms from other employers so long as the attempt is made
pursuant to the union's own interests;8 4 (2) that employer-union
combinations to influence public officials in a manner that may be
deleterious to other competitors "is not illegal, either standing alone
or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act".8 "
C.

Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.'s
The Jewel Tea case came before the Supreme Court in the form
of a challenge by the employer to the validity of a clause in its
collective bargaining agreement with the union. The challenged
clause prohibited the operation of meat departments in the employer's stores between the hours of 6:00 P.M. and 9:00 A.M., and
had been acquiesced in by the employer only in the face of a strike
threat. An identical clause had previously been accepted by an association of approximately 1,300 merchants and meat dealers (the
association).
Alleging a conspiracy to inhibit competition by preventing the
sale of meat during the specified hours, the Jewel Tea Company (the
employer) brought suit under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against
the Meat Cutters Union, and the secretary-general of the association, seeking invalidation of the clause, treble damages and attorneys' fees. Although the case did not produce a majority opinion,"s7
182.
183.
Leader,
184.
185.
186.

See text accompanying notes 277-99 infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
310 U.S. 469 (1940). See also text accompanying notes 129-50 supra.
381 U.S. at 665.
Id. at 670.
381 U.S. 676 (1965).

187. Justice White announced the decision of the Court, and wrote on behalf of himself,
Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice. Id. at 679. Justice Goldberg wrote an opinion on behalf
of himself, Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, in which he concurred in the judgment of the
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it can at least be valued for the extent to which it reveals the diversity of opinion and degree of confusion engendered by this area of
the law.
The ultimate question in the case' 8 (i.e., whether the union activities were within the ambit of the labor exemption) was decided on
the most fundamental level by the manner in which the sales hours
restrictions were viewed. The two groups of three justices which
comprised the majority led by Justices White and Goldberg, both
saw the restriction as primarily relating to working hours, a substantial interest of the union. As Justice White put it: "And, although
the effect on competition is apparent and real, perhaps more so than
in the case of the wage agreement, the concern of union members is
immediate and direct."'8 9 For Justice White, the basis for this conclusion was the fact that the trial judge had found the union's evidence tending to show that the working hours of its members would
be affected, more believable than Jewel Tea's evidence that they
would not, and Justice White could not be persuaded that this
finding was "clearly erroneous.""'9 Justice Goldberg's opinion, on
the other hand, reflects a conviction that at least the working hours
of butchers in small service shops would have been adversely affected by any relaxation of the hours restriction for Jewel Tea, since
the small shops, in order to compete, would necessarily have had to
:extend the hours of their butchers.'"' Consequently, Justice Goldberg concluded that the hours restriction clause was clearly of direct
interest to the union and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws.
The dissenters, led by Justice Douglas, viewed the hours restriction as a direct attempt at market control,' 2 albeit the control
sought was one of a temporal nature as opposed to the geographic
area and price controls involved in Allen Bradley. In addition, the
dissenters found that, contrary to the district court's ruling which
was left undisturbed by the majority of the Supreme Court, there
Court in Jewel Tea and dissented from the opinion but concurred in the result of Pennington.
Id. at 732.
188. Another issue that was raised was whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required the courts to defer the central question to the National Labor Relations Board. Apparently, the Court was unanimous in concluding that it did not. For the only real discussion of
the issue see Justice White's opinion, id. at 684-88.
189. Id. at 691.
190. Id. at 697.
191. Id. at 727-29.
192. Id. at 736.
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was evidence of a conspiracy among the association of merchants
and meat dealers in that the collective bargaining agreement itself
showed "it was planned and designed not merely to control but
entirely to prohibit 'the marketing of goods and services' from 6:00
p.m. until 9:00 a.m. the next day".' 3 Arguing that an agreement to
so restrict sales among employers alone would have violated the
antitrust laws, the dissenters concluded that "the unions can no
more aid a group of businessmen to force their competitors to follow
uniform store marketing hours than to force them to sell at fixed
prices."' 94
Justice Goldberg departed from Justice White's opinion in Jewel
Tea primarily on what he saw as a difference of opinion as to the
theoretical scope of the labor exemption. Justice Goldberg, who felt
that all mandatory subjects of bargaining should be beyond the
purview of the antitrust laws,'9 5 felt that Justice White would not
grant antitrust immunity to all agreements dealing with mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining.' 6
Justice White's conclusion that a matter must be such that "the
concern of union members is immediate and direct"'97 in order for
labor policies to outweigh antitrust policies, was unpalatable to Justice Goldberg, who, it will be remembered, thought that the fact
that the hours of some union members (even though working for
another employer) would be affected should be sufficient to make
the issue bargained for a "legitimate object."' 98 It has been suggested that the difference in the two positions is merely one of degree, ' and there is some merit in that contention if one focuses
solely on the end result. Certainly, if the most serious problem in
the law under the labor exemption were that the question of whether
all mandatory bargaining subjects are exempt (and what if any non193. Id. at 737.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 710.
196. Justice Goldberg apparently based his conclusion as to Justice White's position from
the following excerpt:
This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is
automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or form and
content of the agreement.
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965) (White, J.).
197. 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965).
198. Id. at 727-28.
199. 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTrIRUST 618 (1973).
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mandatory subjects are exempt) had not yet been answered
satisfactorily,0 there would be little to discuss. The fundamental
and significant difference between the positions of Justices White
and Goldberg in Jewel Tea, however, is not in the results, but in the
approaches utilized to obtain the results. It is fairly clear that Justice White regarded the labor laws as only one factor (although a
very important one) to be applied in determining the legitimacy of
union activity, and he felt that this factor should be weighed against
the antitrust policy. 20' Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, made it
obvious that he preferred a much more extreme approach, which
would regard all activities, directly or indirectly sanctioned under
the labor laws, to be absolutely exempt from antitrust liability re-2
gardless of their impact on competition or the intent behind them .
Of the two, Justice White's position has the merit of at least some
theoretical flexibility, and
is consistent with the balancing approach
3
used in earlier cases .
D.

20
American Federationof Musicians v. Carroll 1

In Carroll, the Court was confronted with an alleged unlawful
combination between the Musician's Union and band leaders in an
action in which an injunction and treble damages were sought to
remedy purported violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
allegations were bottomed on the fact that the union, with respect
to "club date" engagements,20 had unilaterally adopted bylaws and
regulations requiring orchestra leaders to, among other things,
charge minimum prices set out in a "Price List Booklet." The total
of the minimum wage scales for all musicians engaged, a "leader's
fee" which was to be twice the regular musician's scale when four
or more musicians were to play at an engagement, and 8% of the
total to cover incidentals such as social security, unemployment
insurance, etc., 206 comprised the total minimum charge that leaders
200. See Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 732 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 689, 691.
202. Id. at 707-09.
203. See, e.g., Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665
(1965).
204. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
205. "These are one-time engagements of orchestras to provide music, usually for only a
few hours, at such social events as weddings, fashion shows, commencements, and the like."
Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 104.
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were required to demand. In addition, for traveling engagements, a
leader was required to charge 10% more than the minimum price of
either the home local or the local in whose territory the group was
to play, whichever was the greater.0 7 Usually, the leader would book
the engagements and hire the necessary musicians ("sidemen"),
whom he would then conduct, often playing an instrument himself
at the engagement. All wages and expenses were paid by the leader
out of the sum he had charged the party who had engaged him to
provide music. Occasionally, the leader would neither play nor conduct himself. In such cases, it was customary to hire a "subleader,"
who conducted the orchestra. The union bylaws specified that, in
such instances, the subleader was to be paid one-half times the
regular musician's scale out of the leader's fee. Most orchestra leaders were union members, and sometimes performed in different capacities-leader, subleader or regular musician-during the same
day. It was argued that
(the union's] involvement of the orchestra leaders in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged regulations and
bylaws created a combination or conspiracy with a "non-labor"
group which violates the Sherman Act. 08
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, agreed with the
district court that the orchestra leaders did not comprise a nonlabor group. The Court reasoned that so long as there existed "the
'presence of job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship . . . [which affected] legitimate union interests ....
the independent contractors were a 'labor group' and party to a
labor dispute .... ",,209
The Court went on to state that all labor
disputes were taken outside the scope of the Sherman Act by the
210
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Court further agreed with the district court's finding that the
work of the orchestra leaders actually or potentially affected the
jobs, wages and working conditions of union members. 21 Disagree207. Id. at 105.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 105-06, citing Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94,
103 (1962); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1945); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-36 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm
Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
210. 391 U.S. at 106.
211. This fact, in the opinion of the Court, served to legitimize several of the unions'
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ing with the circuit court's ruling that the establishment of price
minimums by the union constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act,212 the Court quoted from Justice White's opinion in Jewel
Tea to the effect that "'[the crucial determinant is not the form
of the agreement-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative impact on
the product market and the interests of union members.' ",21 But
then the Court went on to say: "The critical inquiry is whether the
price floors in actuality operate to protect the wages of the subleader
and sidemen.

21

1

The Court thus seems to have endorsed the con-

cept of balancing the effect on the product market against the effect
on the interests of union members in one breath (the approach
consistently followed by Justice White, and by the majority of the
2"), and rejecting it in the next. The apparent
Court in Pennington
import of the Court's statement as to what constitutes the "critical
inquiry" is that, if the interests of union members are served by a
given union action, any impact on the product market is immaterial. If this interpretation is correct, it would represent a significant
retreat from Justice White's requirement that, where a unionemployer agreement has an "apparent and real" effect on competition, the interests of the union members must be "immediate and
direct" if the agreement is to qualify for exemption from the anti2
trust laws. 11

The Court felt that when a leader charged below the minimum,
only one of two possible results could occur: either the leader would
practices. The Court's statement in this regard, including citations, was as follows:
[1In the light of the job and wage competition thus established, both courts correctly
held that it was lawful for petitioners to pressure the orchestra leaders to become union
members, Los Angeles Meat Drivers, supra and Milk Wagon Drivers, supra, to insist
upon a closed shop, United States v. American Federationof Musicians, 318 U.S. 741,
affirming 47 F. Supp. 304, to refuse to bargain collectively with the leaders, see Hunt
v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, to impose the minimum employment quotas complained
of, United States v. American Federationof Musicians, supra, to require the orchestra
leaders to use the Form B contract, see Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 (Oliver
I), and to favor local musicians by requiring that higher wages be paid to musicians
from outside a local's jurisdiction, Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of
Painters,105 F. 2d 134.
Id. at 106-07.
212. Id. at 107.
213. Id., quoting from Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5
(1965).
214. 391 U.S. at 108.
215. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666-69 (1965). See Local 189, Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689, 691 (1965). See also text accompanying notes 169-203 supra.
216. See Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965).
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have to work for less than union scale himself, or he would have to
pay the musicians he employed at less than union scale. 217 The

Court then concluded, "the Price List is therefore 'a direct and
frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance
of the basic wage structure .... ",218
Justice White, joined by Justice Black, dissented, on the basis
that the musicians union had combined with a non-labor group to
effectively control the industry. They felt that the union had forced
both membership and union rules not only on band leaders who
cooperated willingly, but also upon others who had no desire to
cooperate. The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, they concluded, were "never intended to give unions this kind of stranglehold on any industry." '
Justice White agreed with the Court's result in most important
respects, except with regard to that part of the minimum charge
that was to be designated leader's fee. He felt that the union could
have, within the ambit of the antitrust exemption, insisted on a
leader's fee "not less than the union scale for a subleader plus the
leader's costs in obtaining the engagement, hiring the musicians,
and planning the program" ' 0 as long as the leader actually did lead
the musicians at the engagement. But requiring the leader to charge
more than union scale for a subleader where the leader did not lead,
however, was to go beyond the protection offered by the exemption
and enter the forbidden realm of price-fixing. The key, Justice
White felt, was that where the leader did not lead, but confined
himself to booking engagements and making other arrangements, he
did no "labor group" work and, for such purposes, was not a member of a labor group within the meaning of the Clayton and NorrisLaGuardia Acts. 22 ' On the facts of the case, therefore, Justice White

felt there existed a combination with a non-labor group that unlawfully restrained trade.2n On the theoretical level, Justice White remained true to his interest-balancing test.no
217. 391 U.S. at 111 n.12.
218. Id. at 110, quoting from Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959).
219. 391 U.S. at 121.
220. Id. at 116.
221. Id. at 117, 120.
222. Id. at 120.
223. Justice White applied his interest balancing test as follows:
Unions are, of course, not without interest in the prices at which employers sell. As
the majority points out, by seeing that employers sell at prices covering all their costs,
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E. Ramsey v. UMW2

1

The Ramsey case, which deserves brief mention here, is the latest
case in this area to have been decided by the Supreme Court. The
case was primarily concerned with the interpretation of § 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 225 and dealt with the standard of proof required to impute liability for the unlawful acts of individuals to
officers or members of an association or organization involved in a
labor dispute. While it is of some relevance, the Court's decision on
this issue is beyond the scope of the present discussion. The Court
in Ramsey was, however, also asked by petitioner coal mine operators to reconsider its holding in Pennington.2 1 To this suggestion,
the Court, per Justice White, responded by reaffirming, at least, the
basic tenents of Pennington which remain good law today. 22 The
law in this respect was perhaps best summarized in the following
excerpt from a recent Ninth Circuit opinion:
The type of activity by non-union entities sufficient to draw
unions with whom they deal within the sphere of Allen Bradley
was and remains uncertain. Union-imposed restraints which
a union can insure employer solvency and make more certain employee collection of
wages owed them. In addition, assuring that competing employers charge at least a
minimum price prevents price competition from exerting downward pressure on wages.
On the other hand, price competition, a significant aid to satisfactory resource allocation and a deterrent to inflation, would be substantially diminished if industry-wide
unions were free to dictate uniform prices through agreements with employers. I have
always thought that this strong policy outweighed the legitimate union interest in the
prices at which employers sell, and until today I had thought that the Court agreed.
Id. at 119 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
224. 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).
226. 401 U.S. at 312. See also text accompanying notes 169-85 supra.
227. The Court stated:
The Court made it unmistakably clear in Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, that unilateral
conduct by a union of the type protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
does not violate the Sherman Act even though it may also restrain trade. . . . We
adhere to this view. But neither do we retreat from the "one line which we can draw
with assurance that we follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared
the concentrated power of business organizations to dominate markets and
prices. . . . A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and
such participation is a violation of the Act." Hence we also adhere to the decision in
Pennington: "[T]he relevant labor and antitrust policies compel us to conclude that
the alleged agreement between UMW and the large operators to secure uniform labor
standards throughout the industry, if proved, was not exempt from the anti-trust
laws."
401 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
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serve purposes closely related to wage, hours, and conditions of
employment generally are considered free of Allen Bradley
taint. On the other hand, union cooperation which enables one
or more employers to obtain control of the supply and price of
a certain product in a particular market, or to make possible
the elimination
of troublesome competition, is unmistakably
22 8
tainted.
If the precise parameters of the kinds of union-employer cooperation that may run afoul of antitrust provisions remain unclear, however, the question of what, if any, unilateral union activities can be
subject to antitrust sanctions is completely shrouded in mystery.
III. PENDING CASES: EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING PROBLEMS
As might be expected, labor-antitrust cases continue to generate
litigation. At this point, it may be appropriate to consider three
illustrative cases, which have been recently decided or are currently
pending. These cases serve to point out a few of the many remaining
problem areas.
A.

Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing
29
Committee1

The Bodine case, decided in March of 1974 by the Ninth Circuit,
had to do with the well-publicized concerted group boycott, which
the Farm Workers have been using to force recognition of their
union by certain grape growers. Plaintiffs in the case were a group
of Arizona growers and shippers of table grapes, who sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. Defendant Farm Workers moved to dismiss in the
district court on grounds that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court denied the
motion to dismiss, and it was on appeal from this ruling that the
case came before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.20
The circuit court's opinion began with an extensive review of the,
history of the labor exemption. 2 1 The more important conclusions
228. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 551
(9th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
229. 494 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1974).
230. Id. at 543.
231. Id. at 544-56.
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reached by the court in its historical review include: (1) that United
States v. Hutcheson2 32 was the Supreme Court decision "on which
prevailing views of the exemption rest"; 233 (2) that agricultural em-

ployees were excluded from the benefits and burdens of the National
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959;234 (3) that Hutcheson, unlike later cases which included consideration of the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments,
"referred only to the necessity of harmonizing the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts with the Sherman Act"; 23 and (4) that con-

sequently, agricultural unions are entitled to an exemption no more
restrictive than that provided by Hutcheson, since later court decisions and legislative enactments have done nothing to indicate to
the contrary.236 Having drawn these conclusions, the court then proceeded to review the allegations in the complaint of the grape growers, measuring their validity as claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act against the very permissive standards to be applied
237
in a motion to dismiss.

The first allegation considered by the court was the charge that
the United Farm Workers' Organizing Committee (UFWOC) and
its officers had entered into a conspiracy with the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters Union, in which the Meat Cutters had in fact enforced
the boycott through a variety of tactics, including threats and coercion.? 8 In short, this portion of the complaint alleged a secondary
boycott, which but for the fact that agricultural workers are exempt
from the Labor-Management Relations Act (as amended),239 would
232. See text accompanying notes 134-50 supra.
233. 494 F.2d at 554.
234. Id. at 553-54.
235. Id. at 554.
236. Id. at 554-56.
237. The court quoted the following as an articulation of its standard vis-A-vis motions
to dismiss:
A complaint is not subject to dismissal unless it appears to a certainty that no relief
can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved in support of its allegations.
This rule, which has been stated literally hundreds of times, precludes final dismissal
for insufficiency of the complaint except in the extraordinary case where the pleader
makes allegations that show on the face of the complaint some insuperable bar to relief.
Id. at 556 (footnote omitted), quoting from C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoUrTS 285-86 (2d
ed. 1970).
238. The full text of this portion of the complaint was quoted by the court. 494 F.2d at
557 n.48.
239. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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almost certainly have been a violation of that Act.240 The court did
not feel, however, that this allegation stated a valid claim under the
antitrust laws because it did not allege conduct constituting a combination with a non-labor group, nor did the allegation imply conduct that aided and abetted businessmen pursuing a course violative of the Sherman Act such as had been the case in Allen
Bradley.24 1 Noting that the goal of the boycott was the recognition
of the UFWOC by the growers, the court further concluded that the
agreement with the Meat Cutters had not run afoul of the
Pennington and Jewel Tea doctrines."'
The second allegation considered by the court was that the defendants attempted to and did combine with non-labor groups in
agreements "not to purchase, handle or sell table grapes."2 '3 The
court felt that this allegation described conduct that amounted to
a combination with a non-labor group, but that the activities were
nevertheless within the bounds of conduct protected by the labor
44
exemption.
The third allegation was also found by the court to be deficient.
It charged that the Farm Workers had violated the Sherman Act by
using coercion, threats of financial ruin and intimidation in an effort
to force plaintiffs' customers to cease purchasing, handling, transporting or selling plaintiffs' grapes.243 Some of this, it was alleged,
had been carried out by non-labor groups. To these charges, the
court responded that restraints "imposed by labor but which are not
within the Sherman Act 'are not brought within its sweep merely
because, without other differences, they are attended by violence.' ",241 The court indicated that violent conduct is properly the
240. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970). Basically, this section makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to threaten, coerce or restrain any person with the object of forcing him
to stop dealing in the products of any other producer or manufacturer.
241. 494 F.2d at 557.
242. Id. at 557-58.
243. Id. at 558 n.49.
244. With respect to the legality of such combinations, the court stated:
The mere combination by a union with "non-labor groups" does not violate the
Sherman Act. To hold otherwise would invalidate collective bargaining. Whether the
combination violates the antitrust laws turns on the purpose served thereby. Here it
is clear that the overwhelmingly predominant purpose of the union was to secure the
objective of recognition by the plaintiffs. This is enough to insulate the combination
from laws designed primarily to proscribe combinations between business groups.
Id. at 558.
245. The full text of this portion of the complaint was quoted by the court. Id. at 558 n.50.
246. Id. at 559, citing Apex Hosie Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940).
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subject of state law, and that to bring such conduct under the Sherman Act "would greatly expand the federal responsibility for local
law enforcement and reduce the [labor] exemption's scope significantly".'47
The fourth and final specific allegation ruled on by the court
maintained that the Farm Workers, as an inducement for recognition, had offered to lift the boycott from plaintiffs' competitors
while maintaining it as to plaintiffs' products. Allegedly, when
plaintiffs' competitors accepted the offer and, in return, recognized
the union, there arose an unlawful combination between the defendant union and a non-labor group (plaintiffs' competitors), as a
result of which the competitors who were parties to the combination
received a significant market advantage. '" The court, however,
found this conduct to be distinguishable from that which had been
condemned in the Allen Bradley and Pennington cases. The court
reasoned that the allegations, when viewed along with the entire
complaint, could not be read to charge defendants with combining
with plaintiffs' competitors to allow the competitors to control the
supply and price of table grapes or to eliminate plaintiffs as competitors."' Furthermore, the court felt that the defendants had not
impaired their power to bargain with the plaintiffs other than to
25
maintain a boycott until recognized. 0

Finally, the court turned to the general allegations contained in
plaintiffs' complaint which merely stated in non-specific terms that
defendants had participated in a conspiracy, among themselves and
with others (including non-labor groups), to restrain trade by effecting a boycott of table grapes.2' Such general allegations, the court
reasoned, were not vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, and because
of them the case was remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. This, however, signified only a very minor victory for
the plaintiffs. The court stated that, since the plaintiffs' specific
allegations had failed to state any violation of the Sherman Act, it
would be difficult for the plaintiffs to establish their case upon
remand. =2
247. 494 F.2d at 559.
248. The text of this portion of the complaint was quoted by the court. Id. at 560 n.53.
249. Id. at 560.
250. Id.
251. The text of this portion of the complaint was quoted by the court. Id. at 561.
252. The court's reasoning was as follows:
These general allegations are sufficiently broad to embrace perhaps all, and at least
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Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100253

The Connell case is certainly destined to be a significant one. The
Supreme Court's decision in the Connell case will be especially
interesting for two reasons. First, it squarely presents, for the first
time since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the question of
what, if any, union antitrust liability may arise from activity in the
nature of a secondary boycott or strike. Secondly, it will be the first
labor-antitrust case to have been decided since Justices Powell and
Rehnquist have been appointed to replace the late Justices Harlan
and Black.
The facts of the case are very simple.54 The defendant union had
contacted Connell, a general contractor in the construction business, and asked Connell to agree to not do any business with any
plumbing and mechanical firm unless such firm were party to a
collective bargaining agreement with the defendant union. It threatened to picket the various construction sites where Connell was
general contractor if the offer of agreement was refused. When Connell failed to consent to the proposed agreement, the union placed
a picket at one of Connell's construction sites, causing 150 employees of Connell and its various subcontractors to walk off the job,
thus halting work on the project. When its efforts to obtain an
injunction against the picketing were frustrated, Connell entered
into the proposed agreement under protest. Connell then brought
suit under the antitrust laws, charging that the union had undertaken to restrict competition by forcing Connell to give all its work
to unionized subcontractors, irrespective of whether such contractors submitted the lowest bid. This, Connell argued, was a violation
of the antitrust laws, and after the district court ruled in favor of
the defendant union, Connell appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
part, of the activities not specifically alleged by the plaintiffs. Moreover, such activities cannot unreservedly be placed within the labor exemption to the Sherman
Act. . . . It does not appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief". The failure of the specific
allegations to transgress the limits of the exemption may suggest that the plaintiffs
will have difficulty in establishing their case following further proceedings in the trial
court, but it by no means establishes that there exists on the face of the complaint
"some insuperable bar to relief".
Id. at 561-62 (footnotes omitted).
253. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
254. For the court's rendition of the facts see id. at 1156-57.
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After reviewing the history of the labor exemption, the circuit
court held, among other things: (1) that where the only non-labor
group with which a union is alleged to have conspired is the very
party seeking to invoke the antitrust laws, there is no conspiracy
such as that condemned in Allen Bradley and Pennington;55 (2)
that the agreement secured from Connell by the union involved a
legitimate union interest and did not violate the antitrust laws in
that it sought only to eliminate competition based on labor standards and wages;256 (3) that for antitrust purposes, the term "legitimate union interest" is not controlled by whether the goal sought
or the method used violate provisions of the National Labor Relations Act;'5 7 (4) that in any event, the question of whether the labor
laws have been contravened is a matter for the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board;2 8 and (5) that since the
activity of the union in Connell was protected or prohibited by §§
8(e) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act,a6 federal law preempted and Connell could have no right of action under
state antitrust laws. 210 Thus, the court felt, the district court's ruling
adverse to Connell had to be affirmed.28 '
While much of the court's opinion would warrant considerable
discussion, the reasoning behind the second and third conclusions
is of particular interest. First, as to the conclusion that the union
activities in Connell involved only a "legitimate union interest," the
court pointed out that the "central reason" the union wanted the
agreement from Connell was to aid in organizing non-union subcontractors. 2 2 This in turn, the court argued, would aid the union "in
its battle to eliminate competition based on differences in wage and
labor standards," a well-established legitimate union objective.2 3
The court, in fact, went on to say that the interest of the union
would be legitimate even where the subcontractors sought to be
organized already paid union scale and met all other union stan255. Id. at 1165-66.
256. Id. at 1166-67.
257. Id. at 1170.
258. Id. at 1173-74. But see Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 68488 (1965).
259. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), 158(e) (1970).
260. 483 F.2d at 1175.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1167.
263. Id.at 1170-71.
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dards. 211 In other words, unions apparently have a legitimate inter-

est in organization for the sake of organization. The court did note,
however, that there are other interests to be considered, such as the
right of employees to exercise free choice and the anti-inflationary
role played by non-union contractors, in so far as they act as a brake
on union demands. The court, however, concluded that congressional intent was that policies, such as employee freedom of choice,
were to be protected by the labor laws and not the antitrust prohibi5
26

tions.

With respect to its conclusion that legality under the N.L.R.A. is
immaterial to the question of whether a given union activity constitutes a "legitimate union interest" for antitrust purposes, the court
noted that Congress has indeed concluded that "hot cargo clauses"
and other forms of secondary activities are, with only very limited
exceptions, "simply too powerful a weapon and too subject to abuse
• . . to be allowed. 2 6' The court felt, however, that "[olutlawing
the means in no way outlawed the goal." 2 67 Thus, the court con-

cluded, when a union violates the N.L.R.A., it subjects itself, not
to the antitrust sanctions, but to punishments specified by Congress
in the labor laws.268 Precisely what troubled the court in the proposi-

tion that unions might violate the antitrust laws as a consequence
of committing unfair labor practices was that Congress had never
indicated that a violation of the labor laws should subject a union
to the sanctions for violation of the antitrust laws. The court felt
that, if it allowed the case to continue, the union would be subject
269
to the antitrust sanctions.

264. Id. at 1171.
265. Id. at 1167-68 n.5.
266. Id. at 1172.
267. Id. at 1170.
268. Id.
269. The court said:
In short, if we find this activity an unfair labor practice we will be deciding that
Congress has directly addressed this question and decided how the balance of interest
between labor and management is to be struck in the public interest. But no where
has Congress ever said that a violation of the labor laws should give rise to treble
antitrust damages, possible criminal punishments, and attorney's fees for the plaintiffs. Yet, allowing this suit to continue as an antitrust action merely because a violation of the labor laws was found would involve those punishments.
Id. at 1169-70.
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Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & ConstructionTrades
Council70

The Altemose case, currently pending in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, deserves brief mention because it involves issues which must disturb every member of
society who confronts them. The complaint, brought by Altemose
and several other open shop construction contractors in the Greater
Philadelphia area, alleges union activities which, if proven, must be
numbered among the most egregious union abuses in the history of
the American labor movement.' The plaintiffs charge an unlawful
combination in restraint of trade in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and seek injunctive relief and treble damages. 2 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the defendant unions have used coercion and intimidation to obtain an agreement from open shop contractors which would prohibit them from doing business with nonunion subcontractors. Likewise, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant unions have used coercion and intimidation to induce suppliers
to stop deliveries to the non-union contractors, to induce banks to
stop lending them money, and to induce construction purchasers to
stop doing business with them.273 Moreover, the plaintiffs claim that
the methods employed in these attempts to coerce have included
brutal assaults, sometimes en masse, on numerous individuals and
the malicious, wanton destruction of private property in the thousands of dollars, including the complete demolition of some buildings with dynamite. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants have expressly disavowed any interest in organizing plaintiffs'
employees, and that the real intent behind defendants' actions is
that of creating a monopoly for union contractors in the Philadelphia area.
Of course, much remains to be seen and proven in the Altemose
litigation. One cornerstone of the plaintiffs' case is the contention
that the use of secondary pressures of the sort alleged is unlawful
and therefore "beyond the scope of legitimate labor activity". 4 The
270. Civil No. 73-773 (E.D. Pa., filed Mar. 29, 1973).
271. Complaint, Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, Civil No.
73-773 (E.D. Pa., filed Mar. 29, 1973).
272. Id. at 20.
273. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 26, Altemose Constr. Co.
v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, Civil No. 73-773 (E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 17, 1973).
274. Id. at 13.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 411

outcome in this question will almost certainly be influenced by the
upcoming Supreme Court decision in the Connell case.27 But if one
assumes that at least some of the allegations of illegal conduct can
withstand the test of litigation, it may not be too long before a
circuit court and eventually the Supreme Court will be given the
opportunity to decide a case involving both secondary activity and
extreme misconduct. It would be an opportunity to bring the full
weight of the antitrust sanctions against those who might otherwise
try to hide behind the labor exemption-an opportunity to end the
use of the exemption as a license for lawlessness.
IV.

THE CASE FOR APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO CERTAIN

UNION AcTrvrrIES
It has been said that labor-antitrust is not one of the most inspiring chapters in our judicial history, and that the judicial decisions
are less than exemplary. 26 Certainly the foregoing review of past and
present decisions should have demonstrated that judicial thinking
in this area is not to be noted either for its logic or its clarity. All
this would seem to suggest that the courts have not interpreted and
applied the basic principles correctly, or that the basic principles
themselves suffer from some inherent defect. In either case, the time
seems to have come for revision of the laws either judicially or legislatively. But before an intelligent determination can be made as to
what the appropriate form (and means) of revision might be, the
basic principles should first be revisited with an eye to changes in
context which may have already affected their validity.
A.

Social and Legislative Changes Since the Passage of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardiaActs

To evaluate the continuing validity of the principle underpinnings of the labor exemption, one must first consider what specifically was intended at the time the exemption was conceived. As
previously noted, 7 it is fairly clear that Congress did not intend,
through the promulgation of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, to
provide labor with a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws. It
is also clear that Congress was interested in protecting a weak and
275.

276.
277.

See text accompanying notes 253-69 supra.
2 M. HANDLER, TwENTY-FvE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 1086 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
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nascent labor movement from destruction at the hands of powerful
industrialists who had a demonstrated ability to use the courts to
their advantage. Section 20 was designed to provide unions with the
essentials for survival-i.e., the mechanisms for organizing-and to
protect them from legal penalties for using them. But it is also
apparent that the congressional purpose contemplated the imposition of antitrust sanctions where unions engaged in activities (including secondary boycotts and other unlawful conduct), not specifically protected by § 20, which restrained or were intended to restrain trade."' In sum, the emphasis was on nurturing a struggling
movement, still fighting for acceptance by society, while stopping
short of providing unions with a carte blanche to commit unlawful,
antisocial acts, as they were then, and remain, occasionally want to
do.
Much the same kinds of concern served to propel the NorrisLaGuardia Bill into law.2 9 The injunction had been used to inhibit
the development and growth of labor unions, and because the balance was still tipped more or less overwhelmingly in favor of employers at the time, Congress felt justified in removing one of the
legal weapons at the disposal of the anti-labor forces. In all the years
of litigation after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, however,
it seems incomprehensible that the courts have been unwilling or
unable to recognize the impressive foresight of that Act's promulgators. Nevertheless, that is precisely what has happened. It should
be remembered that Congress prefaced the anti-injunction provisions with its statement of policy in § 2,2° about which Senator
Norris commented:
If the act or any part of it should be involved in any litigation
where an injunction was issued or asked for, the judge before
whom such action was pending would be required to give full
force and effect to the public policy thus declared by the act;
and, having in mind the public policy thus declared, he would
be able to so construe the various provisions of the act as to give
full effect and validity to the public policy thus declared.'
The tone of the public policy was set by the reference in its first
278. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
279. See text accompanying notes 114-27 supra.
280. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 2, 47
Stat. 70). For the text of the policy provisions of § 2 see text accompanying note 117 supra.
281. 75 CONG. REc. 4503 (1932).
282. Id. at 6452 (1932) (remarks of Senator Long).
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phrase to "prevailing economic conditions," from which the drafters
went on to speak of the "helpless" individual worker and the need
for protection of his rights to organize and to be free from interference and restraint from his employers with respect to participation
in concerted activities "for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection." It is abundantly clear that Congress sought to alleviate the power imbalance that then existed in
the labor-management relationship. But the phrase "under prevailing economic conditions" suggests, if it does not indeed compel, the
conclusion that Congress was fully cognizant of the fact that the
balance could shift, and that such a change in conditions should be
considered in the application of the restrictions sought to be imposed on the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. It seems that
Congress was much more sensitive than the courts that have since
sought to apply the Act in the antitrust context to the fact that
equity is an elusive concept, that what is equitable in one situation
may be manifestly unjust in another, and that the delicacy of the
balance in the labor-management relationship precludes regulation
by categorical and immutable principles.
What were the "prevailing economic conditions" at the time Congress passed Norris-LaGuardia? For one thing the country was in
the throes of a major depression, with over 10 million unemployed,
a fact that weighed heavily on legislators at the time. 282 For another,
total union membership in the U. S. in 1932 was about 3,050,000,23
an increase of only about 500,00084 in the almost twenty years after
passage of the Clayton Act. Finally, at the time Congress was considering the Norris-LaGuardia Act, § § 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act
were the only existing pieces of legislation that expressly recognized
any right on the part of the workers to organize and bargain collectively.
How have conditions changed since the passage of NorrisLaGuardia? First, the nation was fortunately able to fully recover
from its depression, and we have been able, in the last 40 or so years,
to avoid a repetition of that sobering experience. Secondly, the
numerical strength of labor unions increased exponentially in the
283. U.S.
345 (1973).

BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS

284. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, HIsTOmCAL. STATISTICS OF THE U.S. To 1957, at 98 (1960).

COLONIAL TIMES
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immediate post-Norris-LaGuardia period, with membership increasing by nearly 6 million in the first six years. 85 By 1970, total
membership in labor unions had reached approximately 20 million. 6 Along with numerical increases have come corresponding
increases in financial resources and political influence. Today, organized labor is economically and politically one of the most powerful entities in the country."s7 In addition, the rights of workers to
bargain collectively and engage in concerted activities, free from
employer interference, received statutory recognition and elaborate
protection in the Wagner Act of 1937.28

All of this would seem to suggest that organized labor has come
of age, and that the breadth of its exemption from the antitrust laws
should be reconsidered. The Supreme Court, in a different context,
recognized only recently in the case of Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union,"' that "[t]he Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive
to a situation totally different from that which exists today."21' Noting that labor unions have grown in strength, and that "congressional emphasis has shifted from protection of the nascent labor
movement, .. . "I"the Court opined that "[t]he literal terms of
§ 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act"2 ' (one of the cornerstones to the
labor antitrust exemption) could be deviated from under some circumstances. The Court concluded that:
Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration
upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the
total corpus of pertinent law and2 the policies that inspired
ostensibly inconsistent provisions.

1

These revelations notwithstanding, however, United States v.
Hutcheson,"4 with its sweeping assertions about the degree to which
285. B. MrrcHEIL, THE DEPREssION DECADE: FROM NEw ERA THROUGH NEW DEAL, 19291941, at 272 (1972).
286. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
345 (1973).
287. See D. CADDY, THE HUNDRED MILON DouAR PAYOFF (1974).
288. National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (currently codified,
as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)).
289. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
290. Id. at 250.
291. Id. at 251.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 250.
294. See text accompanying notes 134-50 supra.
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Norris-LaGuardia extended the scope of the labor exemption, remains to this day the case "that set the Court on the path upon
which it presently walks." ' Even if one assumes that Hutcheson
did not go too far in 1940, it is a sad commentary on our judiciary
that, in the labor-antitrust area, it has been unable to perceive the
wisdom of the flexibility Congress chose to build into the NorrisLaGuardia Act in the policy statement of § 2. The courts have
simply failed to respond to the implicit invitation to accommodate
the conflicting policies of the antitrust and labor laws in a manner
that more accurately reflects the present balance of power.
B. Accomodating Conflicting Policies
One commentator has aptly summed up the existing state of the
law as follows:
The crux of [the labor-antitrust] cases is that the Supreme
Court, when forced to choose, has elected to subordinate the
national policy protecting competition to the national policy
protecting collective bargaining. The Sherman Act is made to
yield to the Wagner Act.29
Few today would argue that the right of workers to organize and
the institution of collective bargaining do not deserve protection. At
the same time, however, few would suggest that we should abandon
our protection of competition. Because these two policies, both of
which are well established in our society, inevitably conflict, efforts
must be made to accommodate them. Moreover, the accommodation process must look beyond the benefits and detriments falling
on labor or management, and consider the combined impact on
society as a whole from the application of the two policies.
It is hardly debatable that organized labor presently has the capacity not only to hold its own in the labor-management struggle,
but also to exert enormous influence upon the product market. 27
While it may once have been valid to "accommodate" the antitrust
and labor policies by having the former yield almost entirely to the
295. Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 550
(9th Cir. 1974).
296. Timbers, The Problems of Union Power and Antitrust Legislation, 16 LAB. L.J. 545,
559 (1965).
297. See Winter, Collective Bargainingand Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 17-23 (1963).
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latter, there is simply no longer the economic and social justification
for such an approach. This is not to say, however, that we should
return to the era when antitrust reigned at the expense of collective
bargaining. Maintenance of the institution of collective bargaining
has undoubtedly benefited our society. But, as has been noted elsewhere:
If collective bargaining is to be encouraged, it is because it
is a regulating process which produces results that are compatible with the public interest. To achieve this goal, those who
shape the law should be concerned first with the maintenance
of an appropriate power balance between the negotiating parties to encourage settlements which are at levels compatible
with the rate productivity is improving .... 298
Insofar as the labor exemption promotes a power imbalance, then,
society's benefits from both collective bargaining and competition
are correspondingly diminished. In this age of spiraling inflation,
such a state of affairs cannot long be tolerated. But the simple fact
is that the power balance is now tipped in labor's favor to the detriment of the entire society. Many people, both in and out of government, have recognized the need to correct the imbalance. Commissioner Mayo J. Thompson of the Federal Trade Commission, for
example, declared in a recent speech:
Many labor unions in the United States and in the other
industrialized countries of the world clearly exercise a degree
of monopoly power over the world's economies that is grossly
inconsistent with the welfare of the great bulk of its citizens.
My conclusion, then, is that the time has come to start cutting back on the monopoly power wielded by the trade unions
in this country, perhaps by subjecting those unions to a modi211
fled version of our current antitrust laws ....
Recognizing that a problem of imbalance exists, and that greater
use of our antitrust laws may provide part of the solution, however,
is only the beginning. The much more difficult process is that of
fashioning the appropriate remedy. To contemplate a complete re298.

Connolly, Developing Trends Under the National Labor Relations Act, in

SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION,

PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTIETH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR

160 (1974).
299. Address by Commissioner Thompson, National Fluid Power Association Meeting,
May 6, 1974.
LAWS
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peal of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and relevant portions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act would not only be politically unrealistic, but
probably too extreme for proper resolution of the problems. Complete nullification of the labor exemption could no more be termed
'accommodation" of the policies in question than could the present
one-sided state of the law. The solution lies instead in drawing a line
which would allow collective bargaining to flourish without permitting unions to utilize anti-competitive activities to create the kind
of power imbalance that detracts from the effectiveness of collective
bargaining as a regulatory process and one which can serve the
public interest. What must be sought, in short, is a more acceptable
definition of what constitutes, in the words of § 6 of the Clayton Act,
"lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives" of organized labor.
C.

Legitimate Union Activity and the Legality of Union Conduct
That Restrains Trade

It has been suggested by some, including Federal Trade Commissioner Thompson,"' that monopolies within the labor market itself
should be subjected to the scrutiny of the antitrust laws. The proponents of this approach argue that industry-wide bargaining by unions is a major factor influencing the rate of inflation, and should
be eliminated. Such an approach, however, would be fraught with
difficulty. In the first place, the fundamental principle embodied in
§ 6 of the Clayton Act-that labor is not a commodity and, hence,
anti-competitive practices within the labor market are inherently
different from similar practices within a product market-enjoys
wide acceptance within our society. Consequently, the political and
social obstacles which would have to be surmounted to bring labor
monopolies under the antitrust laws would be extremely formidable,
if not insuperable. Although it might be feasible to seek some regulation of industry-wide bargaining, inter-union collusion and the
like under the labor laws, and the conceptual barrier which would
obstruct efforts to reach such conduct with antitrust sanctions can
scarcely be overestimated. Furthermore, there are some fairly respectable arguments against breaking up the large unions.", It is,
for instance, contended that the sophistication of the large unions
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Sheed, What Ever Happened to the Labor Movement?, ATLANTic, July,
1973, at 68.

1975

Antitrust Exemption for Labor

promotes stability in industrial relations in that these unions, with
their more elaborate data-gathering resources, can more realistically appraise the reasonableness of their demands. It is also argued
that the large unions have a deeper appreciation for the long range
destructive effects of needless industrial strife, and are therefore
more inclined to follow a rational course. There are, of course,
counters to these arguments, but it is beyond the scope of this
article to attempt to evaluate the merits of this particular debate.
Suffice it to say that the mere fact that such arguments have been
and are being made should be enough to induce the objective observer to conclude that the chances of regulating the labor market
with antitrust principles is less than overwhelming.
Most, if not all, of the arguments favoring protection of labor
union activity, however, lose their force when unions engage in activity or seek a goal that, irrespective of the antitrust laws, is illegal.
Even the staunchest advocate of labor's cause would have difficulty
arguing that such conduct is "legitimate" union activity, since § 6
of the Clayton Act clearly states: "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed . . . to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carryingout the legitimate objects thereof. ... "" By the same token, the NorrisLaGuardia Act, by its terms, seeks to protect only methods "not
involving fraud
or violence" and concerted activities conducted
"peaceably. 0'3 3 Finally, if there is anything that clearly upsets the
balance of power in the collective bargaining relationship, it is the
ability of one of the parties to use illegal means or to seek illegal
ends vis-A-vis the other party.
In the light of historical developments, it would appear that legal
guidelines relating to the labor exemption must be reformulated to
eliminate unnecessary and unfair advantages which derive from its
application. The problems posed strongly suggest that a meaningful
accommodation of antitrust and labor policies could most effectively be accomplished through the application of the following
principles:
302. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) (emphasis supplied). See also text accompanying notes 45-58
supra.
303. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
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(a) Per se "legitimate" (and therefore exempt) union conduct
should be defined as that conduct which is expressly protected
by law, including the enumerated activities of § 20 of the Clayton Act'"4 and § 7 of the Wagner Act.'"' In addition, the activities specifically enumerated in § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 35 should be defined to be beyond the reach of injunctive
relief unless, in light of all the circumstances, the damage to
competition that would result from the denial of such relief
could be shown to be clearly greater than the damage to the
collective bargaining process and the right of workers to engage
in concerted action which would result from granting an injunction or restraining order. Irrespective of the availability of
injunctive relief, however, the activities enumerated in § 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not necessarily be beyond the
reach of actions for treble damages and criminal prosecution
unless specifically sanctioned by some other provision of law.
(b) On the other hand, union conduct that violates some positive provision of law, other than the antitrust laws themselves,
and that is intended to or had the necessary effect of restraining interstate trade, should be defined as per se violations of
the antitrust laws. This would include such acts as violence,
by §§ 8(b) and 8(e) of the Wagfraud and conduct proscribed
3 7
ner Act (as amended). 1
(c) Additionally, all union conduct neither protected nor proscribed by any positive provision of law, which is intended to
or has the necessary effect of restraining interstate trade,
should be adjudged to be in violation of the antitrust laws
304. Id. § 52. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
305. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat.
452). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a)(3) . ...
306. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra.
307. Section 8(b) sets out what constitutes labor union unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(b)(1)-(7) (1970). Section 8(e) in general outlaws agreements between employers and
labor organizations whereby the employer agrees to refrain from using the products of another
person or agrees to cease doing business with any other person. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
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unless it can be clearly shown that, under all the circumstances, the damage to collective bargaining and the right of workers to engage in concerted action that would be done by the
imposition of legal penalties for such conduct would exceed the
damage done to competition by allowing the conduct to go
unpunished.
(d) Where instances of conduct allegedly protected under the
Wagner Act (as amended) are involved, the interpretations of
the Act by the National Labor Relations Board (except where
overruled by the Supreme Court) should be controlling, unless
clearly erroneous. All other provisions of law allegedly sanctioning specific union conduct should be open to interpretation
by the federal courts, subject only to the restriction that such
interpretation be guided by the principle of accommodating
national labor and antitrust policies in such a way as to, under
all the circumstances, provide the greatest benefit to society as
a whole.
While this approach would certainly not be free from difficulty,
it defines "legitimate" union activity in such a way as to allow for
imbalances in the collective bargaining relationship and, above all,
to prevent society from being the ultimate loser in labormanagement struggles. The principles employed are, in fact, very
similar to those implicit in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association.118 In that case,
it will be remembered, Justice Brandeis sought to determine the
reasonableness of a union restraint on trade (a nation-wide secondary boycott) by asking: (1) Did the union breach any provision of
its contract? (2) Did the union utilize means that were, of themselves, illegal? (3) Did the union possess a significant power advantage over the employer? and (4) Did the union's activity involve
inter-craft collusion, promote interests that were not legitimate, or
engage in predatory behavior? The similarities between Justice
Brandeis' approach and that proposed above is that both employ a
weighing of the separate interests in a manner that countenances
the balance of power. If anything, Justice Brandeis' approach might
go further in that it implies that inter-craft collusion and nondefensive action on the part of unions may make them culpable for
308.

274 U.S. 37, 56-65 (1926). See also text accompanying notes 105-12 supra.
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any restraints on trade resulting therefrom. It is at least arguable
that the approach suggested here, while sharing the spirit of Justice
Brandeis' method, strikes an even more just balance between the
competing interests.
The primary objection that is generally raised in opposition to the
suggestion that union conduct which is illegal should be subject to
the antitrust laws insofar as it restrains trade, is that there already
exist remedies for such conduct. Violence and fraud, it is pointed
out, are indictable offenses under state laws. This argument was
followed by the Ninth Circuit in Bodine Produce Inc. v. United
Farm Workers Organizing Committee,3 °" where the court said:
To permit wrongful conduct under state law to pierce labor's
exemption under the Sherman Act would greatly expand the
federal responsibility for local law enforcement and reduce the
exemption's scope significantly.'
That the approach would significantly affect the breadth of the
labor exemption is beyond doubt. To raise that fact as an objection,
however, is to beg the question, since the appropriate breadth of the
exemption is precisely that which must be determined. Moreover,
to argue that federal responsibility for local law enforcement will be
"greatly increased" is simply to miss the point. First, the interests
sought to be protected by the state laws against fraud and violence
and federal laws against restraints of commerce are entirely different. The mere fact that an individual may be prosecuted under a
state law to protect a state interest hardly precludes prosecution
under federal laws to protect a distinctly federal interest. Simple
fraud and violence may be one thing, but fraud and violence that
restrain interstate commerce are quite another. Therefore, to the
extent that federal law enforcement responsibility would be increased at all, it would be to protect federal interests and enforce
federal laws. Fraud and violence that did not restrain interstate
trade, like simple car theft, would be no concern of the federal laws
or enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, perpetrators of
fraud and violence (including labor unions) which were intended to
or had the effect of restraining trade, would have harmed a federal
interest and, like the car thief who drives his prize across a state
line, would be subject to the federal laws. This is as it should be.
309.
310.

494 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 229-52 supra.
Id. at 559.
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Similar reasoning applies to conduct proscribed by the Wagner
Act (as amended). Nowhere does it appear that the remedies provided for in the N.L.R.A. are to be the exclusive sanctions imposed
on those who engage in conduct proscribed by the Act, where such
conduct also invades another legally protected interest. Where acts
forbidden by the Wagner Act have been committed that were intended to or had the effect of restraining trade, two seperate federal
interests have been damaged, and remedies appropriate to each
interest should be available.
The case of Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,311
soon to be argued before the Supreme Court, provides an example.
As the Fifth Circuit noted, the secondary activity in Connell may
well have been a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the TaftHartley Act (as amended) .312 If so, the union was guilty of an unfair
labor practice and might be subject to National Labor Relations
Board sanctions. The NLRB, however, does not have responsibility
for effectuating antitrust policies, and the remedy it would fashion
might do little to deter or cure restraints of trade. The courts, therefore, should be able, using the approach proposed above, to fashion
any further remedies which the antitrust policies might demand,
without unduly denigrating the collective bargaining policies the
NLRB is charged with promoting. Put another way, the commission
of unfair labor practices could hardly be defended as being within
the realm of legitimate union activity. Since it is the function of the
NLRB to protect parties to the labor-management relationship in
the exercise of their legitimate rights, the courts would not be invading the province of the Board if they found it necessary to punish
conduct that was illegitimate under the labor laws and that unlawfully restrained trade.
The degrees of deterrence afforded under the various laws is yet
another factor that must be considered. The assignment of penalties
to be available under a given law involves a congressional judgment
which considers the fact that, while less than 100% deterrence may
be adequate to sufficiently protect some policies, less than the fullest possible deterrence may severely impair effectuation of another.
The rather mild penalties available for unfair labor practices, for
example, were designed specifically to remedy problems within the
311.
312.

483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973). See also text accompanying notes 253-69 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970). See note 240 supra.
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narrow context of the labor-management relationship. On the other
hand, the antitrust remedies-including injunctions, treble damages and criminal penalties-are more harsh, implying a congressional judgment that very effective deterrence is essential to the
implementation of our antitrust policies. It may thus be sufficient
that the penalties available under the labor laws for a simple secondary activity (injunctions,3 1 cease and desist orders, 3 4 right of
action for actual damages3 1 ) are not especially effective in preventing the practice.3 11 Secondary activity that also restrains trade, however, demands more adequate measures, if the congressional judgment as to the required degree of deterrence for anti-competitive
practices is to be implemented. In the Connell and Altemose cases
discussed above,"1 7 therefore, if the unlawful secondary activities of
the unions did in fact restrain trade, the aggrieved parties should
be able to invoke the penalties under the labor laws, antitrust laws,
or both, in order that the penalty be sufficient to cure all the types
of injury that have been inflicted.
V.

CONCLUSION

A review and analysis of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws
suggests that the present state of the law is in need of some revision.
The predeliction of the courts to find immunity for union conduct
313. Section 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970), provides authority
for officers or regional attorneys of the NLRB to petition in federal district courts for injunctions if, after preliminary investigation, there is reasonable cause to believe that a § 8(b)(4)
unlawful secondary boycott has been committed. Also, "temporary relief" may be sought by
the NLRB to halt the commission of other unfair labor practices under authority of 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(j) (1970).
314. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970) provides the authority for issuance of cease and desist orders
by the NLRB.
315. Id. § 187 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or
conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [sic] any
violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title
without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction
of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
316. See Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamps, 19
KAN. L. REV. 651, 706 (1971). Secondary boycotts apparently continue to flourish as evidenced
by the fact that in 1972 there were no fewer than 2,596 complaints filed with the NLRB under
§ 8(b)(a) of the L.M.R.A. 1972 NLRB ANN. REP., app. a, Table 2.
317. See text accompanying notes 253-75 supra.
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that restrains trade, even where such conduct also subverts the
national labor policy or violates other laws, must be reversed if
society is to reap any benefits from the policy in favor of preserving
competition. Moreover, the power and influence that labor unions
have attained has created an imbalance in the relative power of the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship. The nation's interest in stemming inflation demands that this imbalance be eliminated, and that the parties be returned to a status of equality. This,
it is submitted, can best be accomplished by narrowing the labor
exemption as proposed above. Basically, the proposal would leave
unchanged the current law with respect to union antitrust liability
arising out of combinations with non-labor groups. The primary
change would be with respect to unilateral union conduct. If such
conduct were found to be in violation of some positive provision of
law (other than the antitrust laws), and if it were intended to or had
the effect of restraining trade, union culpability under the antitrust
laws would arise. Also, where union conduct restrained trade but
was neither proscribed nor protected by any positive provision of
law, the approach proposed herein would permit the finding of antitrust liability unless it could be clearly shown that collective bargaining would be affected more detrimentally by the imposition of
penalties than would competition if such conduct were allowed to
go unpunished.
It is submitted that, while the implementation of this proposal
would do much to effect a more suitable accommodation of the
national labor and antitrust policies, it would not require a radical
departure from the fundamental legal principles which have long
been associated with the two policies. In fact, when all things are
considered, the proposed approach would accommodate the two policies in a manner that would do less violence to both of them than
have the labor-antitrust judicial decisions of the past few decades.
The question thus becomes how to go about changing judicial
decision-making in this area.
It is conceivable that the courts might show some sympathy for
the new approach if directly confronted with it. The fact of the
matter is that judicial implementation of such an approach would
require only a mild retreat from the excesses of Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader3l8 and United States v. Hutcheson.3 9 Nevertheless, it is diffi318.
319.

See text accompanying notes 129-33 supra.
See text accompanying notes 134-50 supra.
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cult to believe that the courts are likely to reverse their consistent
30-year trend toward expanding the labor exemption. In lieu of judicial willingness to adopt a more reasonable approach, legislative
action should be encouraged. Although the Congress has been consistently cold to proposals that would have eliminated or severely
impaired the labor exemption, even labor's strongest allies in the
legislature should find it very difficult to oppose a bill which would
seek to limit the use of the exemption as a license for union lawlessness.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the approach herein proposed were to be adopted, it would not entirely remedy the imbalance which currently exists in the collective bargaining relationship.
Although it might eliminate certain union abuses which exacerbate
that imbalance, the proposed approach, and the antitrust laws in
general, should not be regarded as the panacea for the ills that
afflict our labor relations. While the need to narrow the labor exemption is clear, effort should also be expended to refine the labor
laws so they may more equitably regulate the complex interaction
of labor, management and society.

EDITOR'S NOTE

On June 2, 1975 the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.20 In a 5 to 4 decision the Court held: (1) since Local 100 had no interest in representing Connell's employees, the policy of promoting collective bargaining agreements underlying the national labor laws afforded no protection to the defendant union in its efforts to exclude non-union
subcontractors from the subcontracting market in the Dallas area;32'
(2) the federal courts do have jurisdiction to decide labor law issues
that are collateral issues in suits brought for violation of other federal acts, including the antitrust laws; 22 (3) the agreement forced
320. 43 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 3, 1975). For an extended discussion of the facts of the
case and the lower court opinion see text accompanying notes 253-69 supra.
321. 43 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 3, 1975). See text accompanying notes 262-65 supra.
322. Id. See text accompanying note 258 supra.
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480.1

upon Connell by the union was a "hot-cargo" agreement in violation
of § 8(e) of the NLRA because it was an agreement with a contractor
who did not have a collective bargaining agreement with the
union; 3 3 and (4) Congress had not intended the remedy for violations of § 8(e) be limited solely to those enumerated in the NLRA,
consequently excluding possible remedies under the antitrust
laws.324 The Court then remanded to decide the question of whether
the agreement25was a restraint of trade within the meaning of the
3
Sherman Act.
The major issue raised by Connell was not fully decided by the
Court. As stated earlier, 36 the most significant question raised was
whether a union could be held liable under the antitrust laws for
secondary activity violative of the NLRA. Contrary to the lower
court, 37 the Court found no immunity when dealing with a union
violation of § 8(e). By dealing with the case on the basis of § 8(e),
rather than on the broader question of secondary activity, the Court
secondary activity might
has left open the question of what union
38
suit.
antitrust
an
for
basis
the
provide
323. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4661.
324. Id. at 4662-63.
325. Id. at 4664.
326. See text accompanying note 253 supra.
327. See text accompanying notes 266-69 supra.
328. See text accompanying notes 270-75 supra for a discussion of the Altemose case
which may eventually decide this issue.

